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*

This Article examines the paucity of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) cases that
go to trial and courts’ preference for resolving these disputes at the summary judgment
stage. Using traditional legal analysis and empirical evidence, this Article explores
whether we should expect FOIA cases to go to trial and how the scarcity of FOIA trials
compares to the trial rate in civil litigation generally. It concludes that the unusual
use of summary judgment in FOIA cases has unjustifiably all but eliminated FOIA
trials, which occur in less than 1% of FOIA cases. It further examines how
conducting FOIA trials in appropriate cases might increase the frequency of protransparency case outcomes as intended under the Act, using both empirical analysis
and qualitative conclusions from interviews with attorneys who have litigated FOIA
trials.
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The very word “secrecy” is repugnant in a free and open society; and
we are as a people inherently and historically opposed to secret
societies, to secret oaths and to secret proceedings. We decided long
ago that the dangers of excessive and unwarranted concealment of
pertinent facts far outweighed the dangers which are cited to justify
it.
1
–John F. Kennedy
INTRODUCTION
Not since the days of Watergate intrigue has government secrecy
been as widely discussed as it is today. President George W. Bush’s
Administration built a notorious record of ratcheting back
information disclosure and increasing the amount of government
2
operations conducted without public oversight. Amid the secret
3
4
prisons, covered-up torture in Guantanamo, and missing weapons of
5
mass destruction, the American public’s primary statutory tool for
1. President John F. Kennedy, The President and the Press: Address Before the
American Newspaper Publishers Association (Apr. 27, 1961), available at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Ready-Reference/JFK-Speeches/The-Presidentand-the-Press-Address-before-the-American-Newspaper-Publishers-Association.aspx.
2. See MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, 108TH CONG., SECRECY IN
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 1–2 (Comm. Print 2004) [hereinafter WAXMAN REPORT].
3. See Jeannie Shawl, Bush Confirms Existence of Secret CIA Prisons for High-Value
Terror Detainees, JURIST (Sept. 6, 2006, 2:09 PM), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
paperchase/2006/09/bush-confirms-existence-of-secret-cia.php.
4. See William Glaberson, Torture Acknowledgement Highlights Detainee Issue, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2009, at A21.
5. See Report: No WMD Stockpiles in Iraq, CNN.COM (Oct. 7, 2004, 10:50 AM),
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discovering governmental misconduct—the Freedom of Information
6
Act (FOIA)—was also severely threatened. According to one
congressional report, “[t]he Bush Administration has taken a series
of actions to undermine, and in some instances reverse, the principle
7
that the public has a right to government information under FOIA.”
8
President Barack Obama’s Day One memoranda on FOIA and
9
transparency, therefore, came as a welcome relief to advocates for
government accountability. Proclaiming that “[i]n the face of doubt,
10
openness prevails,” President Obama laid out a vision of
transparency that he hoped would “strengthen our democracy” and
11
“promote[] accountability.” Central to President Obama’s promise
was a shift toward more affirmative disclosure of government
12
information.
Affirmative disclosure—that is, the release of
13
information without waiting for a request from the public —is an
increasingly common demand among transparency advocates. As
seasoned FOIA litigator David C. Vladeck has argued, the Internet
has in many ways “made obsolete the request-and-wait-for-a-response
14
approach designed for paper records.”
The steps President Obama has taken to implement his
transparency policy demonstrate that affirmative disclosure has
indeed been his central focus. Examples of the administration’s
efforts to distance itself from the Bush years of secrecy by increasing
affirmative disclosure include the rollout of Data.gov and
Recovery.gov, which were designed to give the public a central
15
location in which to find government-held data systems and

http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/06/iraq.wmd.report/.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
7. WAXMAN REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
8. Memorandum on Freedom of Info. Act from the President to the Heads of
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Obama
FOIA Memorandum].
9. Memorandum on Transparency and Open Gov’t from the President to the
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter
Obama Transparency Memorandum].
10. Obama FOIA Memorandum, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4683.
11. Obama Transparency Memorandum, 74 Fed. Reg. at 4685.
12. See id. (proclaiming the Obama administration will “disclose information
rapidly”).
13. K. Lloyd Billingsley, A Case of Affirmative Disclosure for California Public Pensions,
S.F. EXAMINER, June 19, 2011, http://www.sfexaminer.com/opinion/opeds/2011/06/case-affirmative-disclosure-california-public-pensions.
14. David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of
Federal Right-to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1793 (2008).
15. See DATA.GOV, www.data.gov/about (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (“The purpose
of Data.gov is to increase public access to high value, machine readable datasets
generated by the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.”).
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16

information about how the economic stimulus money was spent,
and Office of Management and Budget Director Peter Orszag’s order
to all agencies to identify “high value data sets” to be published
17
online.
Despite undeniable improvements in formal transparency policy,
the Obama Administration has come under fire for taking positions
in conflict with the President’s stated goal of openness. The Obama
Administration has, for instance, refused to release seemingly
innocuous records on several occasions, including the Federal
Aviation Administration’s withholding of bird-strike data immediately
following a plane’s dramatic water landing in the Hudson River
18
because of bird strikes to the engines and the General Services
Administration’s withholding of the complete list of .gov domain
19
names owned by the government. Even more controversial topics
have prompted the administration to seek additional legislative
protection for categories of records, such as the terrorist watch list,
despite criticism that individuals wrongly included on the list would
20
not be able to challenge their status, and photos documenting abuse
of terrorism suspects in U.S. custody, despite the public’s interest in
21
An Associated Press
knowing of illegal governmental conduct.
report found that the use of almost every one of FOIA’s exemptions
22
to disclosure rose during President Obama’s first year in office. As
to FOIA litigation, in implementing the presidential memoranda,
Attorney General Eric Holder did not mandate any case-by-case
23
review of pending litigation.
Additionally, in FOIA litigators’
16. See RECOVERY.GOV, www.recovery.gov/About/Pages/About.aspx (last visited
Nov. 14, 2011) (“Recovery.gov is the U.S. government’s official website that provides
easy access to data related to Recovery Act spending and allows for the reporting of
potential fraud, waste, and abuse.”).
17. Memorandum on Open Gov’t Directive from Peter Orszag, Dir., Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of the Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 8, 2009),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/
m10-06.pdf (specifying that agencies should identify three such data sets within fortyfive days and setting additional long-term goals).
18. Michael J. Sniffen, Bird-Strike Data is Cloaked in Secrecy, TRENTON TIMES, Mar.
28, 2009, at A1.
19. Thomas Claburn, Government Keeping Its .Gov Domain Names Secret: Despite a
Presidential Promise of Openness in Government, GSA Officials Decline to Release the Full List
for Fear of Cyberattack, INFORMATIONWEEK (Mar. 2, 2009, 5:40 PM),
http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/policy/215600330.
20. Ellen Nakashima, Administration Seeks to Keep Terror Watch-List Data Secret,
WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2009, at A4.
21. Editorial, Still Too Many Secrets: The Obama Administration Promises More Open
Government—Sometimes, WASH. POST, June 1, 2009, at A14.
22. Sharon Theimer, Promises, Promises: Is Gov’t More Open with Obama?,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 16, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/
financialnews/D9EFOS1O0.htm.
23. See Advancing Freedom of Information in the New Era of Responsibility: Hearing
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experience, the Justice Department’s litigation positions were not
perceptibly changed after the Obama transparency policies were
24
announced.
Even if the Obama Administration were achieving greater
openness than its predecessors, disappointments should not come as
a surprise. No matter how idealistic the governors, there will always
be a need for the public to hold its government accountable and to
demand honesty and transparency. Public oversight is necessary
whenever the government shows reluctance to reveal its operations,
whether those are few or many. Accordingly, the public cannot rely
solely on the increasingly popular affirmative disclosure mechanisms
to meet its needs for government information.
FOIA gives a statutory right to any person to request and receive
25
26
government records, subject to nine enumerated exemptions, and
FOIA uses a request-and-response model, rather than affirmative
27
disclosure, as its primary disclosure mechanism. But as the New York
Times recently noted, “[a]gencies sometimes do not take a [FOIA]
28
case seriously until the requester takes the government to court.”
Because bringing a FOIA case in federal court is the primary legal
tool to challenge the government’s right to keep secret its operations,
the robustness of our democracy rests, at least in part, on the
29
robustness of the FOIA litigation process itself.
Yet, as this Article demonstrates, FOIA litigation is anything but

Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Meredith
Fuchs, General Counsel, Nat’l Sec. Archive). In contrast, Attorney General Janet
Reno, in implementing President William J. Clinton’s FOIA policies, did order
individualized review of pending FOIA litigation. Id. at 5.
24. See Michael J. Sniffen, Secrecy is Still Order of the Day at Justice, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Feb. 17, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the Justice Department under
President Obama chose to defend the Bush Administration’s decision to not release
documents on “domestic wiretapping, data collection on travelers and U.S. citizens,
and interrogation of suspected terrorists”).
25. See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1787 (“FOIA gives any person a right to obtain,
simply by asking for it, any record in the possession and control of a federal agency,
government corporation, or other federal entity . . . .” (footnotes omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2006); see infra text accompanying note 31 (listing
the nine exemptions).
27. See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1797 (describing the request-and-response
process as “[t]he real genius of FOIA”).
28. Scott Shane, A.C.L.U. Lawyers Mine Documents for Truth About Detainees and
Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at A4.
29. Cf. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171–72 (2004)
(“FOIA is often explained as a means for citizens to ‘know what their Government is
up to.’ This phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism. It defines a
structural necessity in a real democracy.” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
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thriving. One day, while attending a regular meeting of FOIA
litigators, a number of us went around the small conference table,
each reporting on any interesting FOIA litigation issues that had
arisen in our practices. The first person discussed a recent attorneys’
fees decision, the second discussed an unusual invocation of an
exemption, and then someone began by stating “I have a FOIA trial
scheduled in December.” Everyone looked up, and note-taking
ceased. “A FOIA trial?” someone asked incredulously. I asked, “You
mean, as a formality? There is a trial date scheduled, but it won’t
really happen, right?” The answer: “No, both parties’ motions for
summary judgment were denied. There is going to be a trial.”
Although we were a room full of FOIA litigators, no one had ever had
a FOIA trial, seen a FOIA trial, or could remember hearing about a
FOIA trial. As this anecdote suggests and this Article shows, it is
extremely unusual for a FOIA case to go to trial. Rather, FOIA cases
that are resolved in litigation, versus settlement, are predominantly
resolved as a matter of law on a motion for summary judgment.
This Article explores the lack of FOIA trials on the federal judicial
docket. Part I provides an overview of FOIA, including the rights of
the public and the process for litigating a request denial. Part II
explores the theoretical framework our legal system uses to
distinguish a question of law from a question of fact. It then
examines the types of questions that frequently arise in FOIA
litigation and argues that many of those questions are appropriately
categorized as questions of fact traditionally resolved at trial. Using
empirical evidence from the Federal Judicial Center’s integrated
database, as well as traditional legal analysis, Part III demonstrates
that in the FOIA context, questions of fact are routinely treated as
questions of law and resolved by courts on summary judgment
motions, all but eliminating trials under FOIA. Part IV discusses the
potential of FOIA trials to promote outcomes that realize FOIA’s goal
of maximum disclosure, highlighting interviews with attorneys who
have litigated some of the rare FOIA trials. This Article concludes
with proposed litigation strategies to increase trial adjudications in
FOIA cases.
I.

WHAT IS FOIA?

FOIA is a powerful legal tool. This statute gives anyone the right to
request federal agency records and requires agencies to release them
30
unless they fall within one of the nine exempt categories.
The
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (applying only to agencies of the executive branch, not
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exemptions to disclosure include classified records, internal agency
records related solely to personnel rules and policies, records
exempted by other statutes, records that contain trade secrets and
confidential commercial information, records that are privileged in
litigation, certain records that implicate personal privacy, certain law
enforcement records, and certain records that concern banking and
31
oil regulation. The purpose of the request and the identity of the
requester make no difference in assessing the requester’s entitlement
32
33
to the records. Anyone can request any records for any reason.
The agency’s obligation, on receipt of a request, is to perform a
search for responsive records that is reasonably calculated to uncover
34
any such records in its possession. The agency must then provide a
35
response to the requester within twenty business days. If the agency
decides to withhold a record under an exemption to disclosure, it
36
It must also
must identify the exemption that it claims applies.
provide records in the format the requester wants, including
37
searchable electronic form, if feasible. On the other hand, agencies
are entitled to charge a requester a fee to recover some of the costs of
the legislative or judicial branches). The President is not an “agency” subject to
FOIA. Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(per curiam). Presidential records are treated separately under the Presidential
Records Act of 1978. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2006).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9). For thirty years, predominantly internal records,
the release of which would risk circumvention of the law, were considered included
within exemption 2 in many circuits. See, e.g., Crooker v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
& Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court recently eliminated
that basis for withholding as not grounded in the statutory text. See Milner v. Dep’t
of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1271 (2011) (rejecting Crooker).
32. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775 (explaining that if a record is able to be
released as to one requester, it must be released as to all). The identity of the
requester matters only when the requester seeks records concerning himself or
authorizes the release of such records to another and thereby waives any exemption
protecting that individual’s privacy. See Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d
1106, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
33. Prior to FOIA, there was a right to public information contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), but it only provided a right to access records
for persons who could demonstrate that they had a legitimate interest in the records.
Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1975 n.50. FOIA was enacted to revoke this requirement
and broaden access to government records. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 22 (1966); S.
REP. NO. 89-813, at 38–40 (1965).
34. See Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(“There is no requirement that an agency search every record system. However, the
agency cannot limit its search to only one record system if there are others that are
likely to turn up the information requested.” (citations omitted)).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
36. Id. § 552(b) (“Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be
provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which
are exempt under this subsection. The amount of information deleted, and the
exemption under which the deletion is made, shall be indicated on the released
portion of the record . . . .”).
37. Id. § 552(a)(3)(B).
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processing the FOIA request, including the costs of personnel time
performing the search, the duplication of the records, and the
38
personnel time reviewing the records for exempt material.
The
types of costs an agency can charge vary depending on the requester’s
eligibility for inclusion in certain categories, such as news media or
39
commercial requesters. In addition to some categories of requesters
entitled to reduced fees, FOIA provides that any requester who
demonstrates the request is “likely to contribute significantly to
public understanding of the operations or activities of the
government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the
40
requester” is entitled to a waiver of otherwise applicable fees.
Finally, requesters are entitled to expedited processing of their
41
requests in certain circumstances.
Disputes arise when requesters are dissatisfied with an agency’s
response, whether because of the agency’s inadequate search for
records, the agency’s withholding some or all of the records, the fees
charged by the agency, or the agency’s determination that the
42
request is not entitled to expedited processing. Disputes also arise
43
when the agency fails to respond within the deadline. This last type
of dispute is not uncommon; some agencies report that, on average,
44
it takes hundreds of days to respond to FOIA requests.
38. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A).
39. FOIA provides that an agency may assess search, duplication, and review fees
for commercial use requesters; duplication fees for educational and scientific
institutions and representatives of the news media; and search and duplication fees
for all other requesters. Id.
40. Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).
41. Id. § 552(a)(6)(E). Under the statute, requesters are entitled to expedited
processing when they demonstrate a “compelling need” for the requested records,
which is defined as:
(I) that a failure to obtain the requested records on an expedited basis
under this paragraph could reasonably be expected to pose an imminent
threat to the life or physical safety of an individual; or
(II) with respect to a request made by a person primarily engaged in
disseminating information, urgency to inform the public concerning actual
or alleged Federal Government activity.
Id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v). In addition, the statute authorizes agencies to promulgate
regulations enumerating any additional circumstances the agencies deem worthy of
expedited processing. Id. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(II).
42. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 858 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (illustrating a dispute over whether the Department of Energy was correct
in withholding documents under FOIA exemptions 5 and 7).
43. E.g., Info. Network for Responsible Mining v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 611 F.
Supp. 2d 1178, 1182 (D. Colo. 2009) (considering a lawsuit brought as a result of the
Bureau of Land Management’s failure to respond to a FOIA request for more than
three months, well exceeding the deadline of twenty business days).
44. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, OFFICE OF INFO.
POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 10–11, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiapost/fy2010-arsummary.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011). For processing and reporting purposes,
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Requesters have the right to administratively appeal an agency
decision under FOIA and, once administrative remedies are
exhausted, file a lawsuit in federal district court to challenge the
45
agency’s decision.
If an agency misses the twenty-business-day
deadline for responding to a FOIA request, a requester may sue
immediately, because the failure to respond constitutes a constructive
denial of the request that need not be exhausted by administrative
46
appeal. Alternatively, if an agency responds but the requester is not
satisfied with the response, the requester must first administratively
47
appeal the decision to an appeals office within the agency. Once an
appeal is filed, the appeals office again has only twenty business days
48
to respond. If the appeal is denied or the time limit runs without a
decision, the requester is deemed to have exhausted all
administrative remedies and may then file a lawsuit challenging the
49
agency’s actions under FOIA.
Once in court, the requester must show only that she complied
with the proper procedures; the burden is then on the agency to
50
justify its withholding of responsive records. The requester bears
the burden of proof only when challenging the denial of a fee waiver
51
or expedited processing. In either case, judicial review of agency

“simple” and “complex” requests are treated separately. Id. at 10. Even for simple
requests, some agency response times are quite lengthy. For instance, in 2010, for
simple requests, the Department of ’Housing and Urban Development’s average
processing time was 312 days, and the Legal Services Corporation’s was 156 days. Id.
at 10–11. For complex requests, the median number of days ranged from below the
20-day time limit to as high as 1716 days. Id. at 11.
45. There is a third venue for resolving FOIA disputes created by the OPEN
Government Act of 2007 § 10, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, 2529, namely the
Office of Government Information Services (OGIS). 5 U.S.C. § 552(h) (Supp. III
2008). OGIS is similar to an ombudsman office for FOIA, providing not only
guidance to agencies and oversight of agency performance under FOIA, but also less
formal dispute resolution services between requesters and agencies. Office of
Government Information Services (OGIS):
Resolving Federal FOIA Disputes, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/ogis/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). For budgetary
reasons, the office was not actually opened until September 2009, id., and it is too
soon to tell whether OGIS will provide a realistic third avenue for dispute resolution
for requesters.
46. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i) (explaining that a requester is deemed to have
exhausted his administrative remedies when the agency fails to comply with the
deadlines for responding to a request); see also id. § 552(a)(4)(B) (granting
jurisdiction to the federal district court to enjoin an agency to produce withheld
records).
47. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i).
48. Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(ii).
49. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B); id. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i).
50. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
51. See Al-Fayed v. CIA, 254 F.3d 300, 301, 309 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (expedited
processing); Larson v. CIA, 843 F.2d 1481, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (fee
waiver).
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52

actions under FOIA is de novo; therefore, theoretically, no
deference is given to the agency’s decision. If the agency loses, the
requester can be awarded costs and attorneys’ fees to be paid by the
53
agency.
The public makes good use of FOIA. In fiscal year 2010, 597,415
requests for records were made to federal government agencies and
54
departments.
The highest numbers of requests went to the
Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, Health and Human
55
Services, and Justice.
The government, however, also makes
frequent use of the exemptions to disclosure. In that same year,
government agencies processed 407,283 FOIA requests to determine
the applicability of the exemptions and eventually denied, in full or
56
in part, 44% of those requests. Despite the high volume of requests
57
and denials, only a small percentage of denials are appealed or
litigated. For example, in 2010 there were 10,948 administrative
58
appeals, while the number of FOIA cases filed in federal court

52. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (establishing de novo review for withholding of
records); Al-Fayed, 254 F.3d at 305 (holding that the court reviews expedited
processing decisions de novo); Larson, 843 F.2d at 1483 (“[T]he standard of review
[for fee waiver determinations is] de novo.”). There is some debate about whether
fee category determinations, such as whether a requester is a representative of the
news media (as opposed to public interest fee waiver determinations), are reviewed
de novo or for abuse of discretion, but a majority of recent decisions have reviewed
those determinations de novo. Compare Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., No. 06-1818, 2007 WL 2248071, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2007) (de
novo), and Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Def., 241 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2003)
(de novo), and Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59
(D.D.C. 2002) (de novo), with Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 122 F.
Supp. 2d 5, 11–12 (D.D.C. 2000) (holding that the proper standard of review is
arbitrary and capricious).
53. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (allowing an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiffs
who “substantially prevailed”). Prior to the OPEN Government Act of 2007,
“substantially prevailed” was not statutorily defined. After the Supreme Court
decided Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health &
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), federal courts began to limit plaintiffs’ ability
to recover attorneys fees in cases where the government released records after having
been sued but prior to a judicial determination of entitlement to relief. See Union of
Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps. v. INS, 336 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2003)
(applying Buckhannon to deny attorneys’ fees); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l
Union v. Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 456–57 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same). The OPEN
Government Act of 2007 amended FOIA to define “substantially prevailed” to
include “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the
complainant’s claim is not insubstantial,” effectively overruling Buckhannon in the
FOIA context. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (Supp. III 2008).
54. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, supra note 44.
55. Id. at 11.
56. Id. at 4.
57. Non-denial disputes are much less common. For example, in 2010, agencies
and departments processed only 6072 requests for expedited processing, in
comparison with 600,849 total FOIA requests processed. Id. at 4, 10.
58. Id. at 13.
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ranges from 300 to 500 per year.
What happens each year in those 300 to 500 litigated FOIA cases is
critical. Records of great public interest are handed over or ordered
released and, perhaps most importantly, judicial decisions guide
future agency determinations about whether records are exempt
from disclosure. As a result, the impact of a single litigated FOIA
case can reach far beyond the records at issue in that dispute.
II. FOIA FACTS
It is not immediately apparent why FOIA cases involve factual
disputes. Litigation over the government’s claim that requested
records are exempt from disclosure, the classic FOIA case, sounds
straightforward: the records are what they are, and they either fall
within one of the exemptions or they do not. At worst, one might
assume a court can determine the correct outcome once it has
60
examined the records in camera, which it is entitled to do by statute.
This assumption is incorrect. The content of the record itself may
not be subject to factual disagreement, but it may be subject to
competing interpretations. Moreover, the content of the record
alone rarely resolves whether an exemption to disclosure applies.
The scope of an exemption often depends on the circumstances
surrounding the record’s creation, the manner in which the record
was used, or whether release of the record might cause a particular
type of harm. As a result, although some FOIA disputes may involve
only legal questions, a substantial number likely center on factual
disputes. Properly categorizing questions that arise in FOIA cases as
legal or factual, however, requires an understanding of how our legal
system distinguishes questions of fact from questions of law.
A. “Fact” and “Law”
The difference between legal questions and factual questions is
59. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Federal Court Cases: Integrated Databases (1979–2008),
which can be obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/72/studies?
archive=ICPSR&q=federal+judicial+center+integrated+database&paging.startRow=1.
After downloading only the civil terminations subsets for the individual years from
2001 to 2008 (study numbers 3415; 4059; 4026; 4348; 4382; 4685; 22,300; and 25,002)
and the civil terminations subset for the combined period of 1970 to 2000 (study
number 8429), I combined the information into a single database. I then converted
the files for use in the statistical software Stata, thereby generating the data described
in this Article. When referring to and citing this material below, I use the shorthand
“FJC Database.” The Stata files used for this analysis, along with instructions, are
available upon request from the author and are also on file with the Law Review.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006).
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often presumed to be self-evident. However, this seemingly simple
distinction requires complex analysis when actually applied, as is true
62
in many areas of law. In one opinion, the Supreme Court had a
moment of candor when it stated, “[w]e acknowledge that the Court
63
has not charted an entirely clear course in this area,” and in
another, the Court declared the distinction between law and fact
64
“vexing.”
Despite this latent complexity, understanding the nuanced
approach necessary to categorize questions as “law” or “fact” is
imperative because the ramifications of the categorization are of
great importance. Questions of law are typically decided by motion;
the court considers legal briefs submitted by each party and
65
sometimes oral arguments presented by their lawyers.
In
61. See Clarence Morris, Law and Fact, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1303, 1303 (1942)
(“Beginning law students are asked to brief cases by separating the facts from the
law—their teachers act as though the distinction were obvious even to the
inexperienced.”).
62. As Clarence Morris explained, the assumption that law and fact are always
obviously distinct “is unwarranted and blinding.” Id. Much like the seemingly selfevident yet ultimately complex distinction between “substance” and “procedure”
necessary to determine whether state or federal law applies in diversity cases brought
in federal court under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the law/fact
distinction is deceptively complex. Indeed, a debate has evolved concerning the
nature of the distinction itself. At one end of the spectrum, there are those who
claim the distinction between law and fact is “purely a creature of convention,” Gary
Lawson, Proving the Law: Not Proven, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992), or constitutes
a “myth,” Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (2003). On the other end, many people argue there are
true analytic differences between the categories. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman,
Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916,
917 (1992). Rather than attempting to chart a new course in the debate over
whether law and fact are ontologically distinct concepts or fictions of the law, this
Article outlines how these two categories are typically applied by courts so as to
examine FOIA disputes against that backdrop.
63. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985). In Miller, the Court held that the
voluntariness of a confession is a legal question subject to de novo review. Id.
64. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). In Pullman, the Court
held that whether evidence demonstrates an intent to discriminate is a factual
question, rather than a legal question. Id. at 278–88. Even today, the Supreme
Court is still confronted with questions of whether a particular dispute is a question
of law or question of fact in varying contexts. Recently, for example, the Court has
received several petitions for certiorari asking it to decide if the question whether
speech is within a government employee’s job duties is a question of law for the court
to decide on summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, or whether it is a question of
fact for the jury. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, York v. Robinson, 130 S. Ct.
1047 (2010) (mem.) (No. 08-1462) (seeking a decision on whether a public
employee is speaking pursuant to official duties is a question of law or a mixed
question of law and fact); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Cooley v. Eng, 130 S. Ct.
1047 (2010) (mem.) (No. 08-1571) (same); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, City of
Maywood v. Densmore, 130 S. Ct. 52 (2009) (mem.) (No. 08-1082) (same). In all
three cases, the Court denied the petitions for certiorari.
65. See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(7) (enumerating types of motions to
dismiss); FED R. CIV. P. 50(a)(1) (allowing a court to grant a motion for judgment as
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comparison, factual inquiries are determined at trial, with all of the
accompanying courtroom drama embodied in evidentiary
presentation:
witness testimony, cross-examination, credibility
attacks, weighing of witness demeanor, and appeals to sympathy and
66
justice. Moreover, identification of an issue as law or fact dictates
the appropriate standard of appellate review, with conclusions of law
67
reviewed de novo and findings of fact reviewed deferentially. Such
review allows appellate courts to revisit factual findings only if they
68
Therefore, the consequences of
are clearly erroneous.
miscategorization may deprive parties the ability to fully present their
cases.
In an early examination of the difference between questions of fact
and questions of law, James Bradley Thayer explained that facts
involve not just “tangible, or visible” things; rather, they encompass
69
“[a]ll inquiries into the truth, the reality, the actuality of things.”
For the most part, modern scholars agree with Thayer.
Quintessential questions of fact are generally considered to be about
what happened, a layperson’s description of events that “exist in the
70
world that lies beyond the law.” As U.S. Court of Appeals Judge
Richard Posner stated, “[s]omething happened, and it is the job of
71
the court to find out what.” These questions are also referred to as
72
“historical facts.” They are “fairly easy to identify” and include the
a matter of law where the evidence is legally insufficient); FED. R. CIV. P. 56
(providing for summary judgment when the movant “is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law”).
66. See Randall H. Warner, All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 101, 104 (2005) (describing the fact finder’s role in assessing testimony
heard first-hand, including “the eye-twitches, sweaty brows, pregnant pauses and
other non-verbal cues”). Certainly, one understanding of the division of labor
between judges and juries is that judges decide questions of law, and juries decide
questions of fact. James B. Thayer, “Law and Fact” in Jury Trials, 4 HARV. L. REV. 141,
141 (1890). Of course, not all trials are jury trials, see FED. R. CIV. P. 39, and bench
trials involve the same types of evidentiary proffers as jury trials.
67. Warner, supra, note 66, at 103 (declaring that “[t]he whole reason for
labeling a question ‘law,’ ‘fact,’ or ‘mixed’ is to determine the standard of review on
appeal”); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 557 (1988) (“For purposes of
standard of review, decisions by judges are traditionally divided into three categories,
denominated questions of law (reviewable de novo), questions of fact (reviewable for
clear error), and matters of discretion (reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion’).”). The
Constitution itself recognizes the review dimension: the Seventh Amendment
proclaims that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined.” U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)(6) (setting out the clearly erroneous standard for
findings of fact made by the court).
69. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 185, 191 (1898).
70. Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487, 487 (1986).
71. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 203 (1993).
72. Warner, supra note 66, at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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For
“who, what, when, where, and how of every legal dispute.”
example, “who was driving the red car when it crashed into the blue
car?” or “for how long did Mary leave the baby in the house alone?”
Historical facts also include a person’s past subjective state of mind,
74
such as knowledge, intent, and good faith.
In addition to “historical facts,” another relatively straightforward
category of factual questions is “predictive facts,” which require the
75
fact finder to predict either actual or hypothetical future reality.
These types of questions include whether and how much economic
injury the plaintiff is likely to suffer in the future or what profits a
76
plaintiff might have made but for the defendant’s conduct.
Questions of predictive fact are also consistently treated as factual
77
questions by courts.
By contrast, a question of law is “a rule or standard which it is the
78
duty of a judicial tribunal to apply and enforce.” In Thayer’s view,
questions of law include an array of subsidiary questions about the
rule or standard: whether a rule applies, its scope and meaning, its
79
interaction with other rules, and whether the rule itself is valid.
Quintessential questions of law are questions such as “can a sixteen
year old enter into a valid contract?” or “how many witnesses are
needed to create an enforceable will?” These questions are the most
general type of questions and state rules that are applicable to society
80
at large, not only to the parties before the court in a given case.
“The important point about law is that it yields a proposition that is
81
general in character.”
The examples above represent the types of questions that are the
most easily categorized. But not all questions are so clear-cut. For
instance, is “did Mary act negligently?” a question of law or a question
73. Id.
74. Id. at 117; e.g., Pullman-Standard v. United Steelworkers of Am., 456 U.S. 273,
288 (1982) (“Treating issues of intent as factual matters for the trier of fact is
commonplace.”).
75. Warner, supra note 66, at 117–18; see Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp.,
Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) (“‘Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered,
which presents a question of historical or predictive fact, the level of punitive
damages is not really a ‘fact’ ‘tried’ by the jury.’” (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for
Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 (1996) (Scalia J., dissenting) (citation
omitted))).
76. Warner, supra note 66, at 117–18.
77. Id.
78. THAYER, supra note 69, at 192.
79. Id. at 193.
80. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235
(1985) (“Law declaration involves formulating a proposition [that] affects not only
the [immediate] case . . . but all others that fall within its terms.” (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
81. Id.
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of fact? On the one hand, negligence is a legal standard; on the
other hand, how Mary acted is a factual matter. Thayer recognized
this grey area of questions as “neither of law nor of fact,” which
82
include “the application of law to fact.”
Thayer coins the term
“ultimate facts” to describe the secondary inferences from the raw
83
Today, those questions are identified as “mixed
facts in a case.
84
questions” of law and fact. Negligence is the classic example of this
85
type of “mixed” question.
Arguing that the “application of law to fact” is too amorphous a
definition of “mixed question,” Judge Randall H. Warner divides
“mixed questions” into three categories: “evaluative determinations,”
86
“definition applications,” and “compound questions.”
These
categories are useful in analyzing the types of questions that arise in
FOIA cases. First, a mixed question is an “evaluative determination”
87
when it requires the decision-maker to exercise judgment. Warner
identifies these types of questions as including negligence, probable
88
cause, reasonableness, and proximate causation.
The evaluative
determination is based on undisputed or already found facts about
89
what happened, but it must be made in each case as a judgment call.
Second, a question can be mixed when it requires a “definition
application,” and the definition is not susceptible to a bright-line
90
rule. For instance, if a certain remedy is available only to people
who suffer severe injury, it is not possible for a court to determine a
bright-line rule defining what type of injury is severe; rather, the
decision-maker will have to apply prior holdings that determined the
91
meaning of “severe” to each new situation. Alternatively, if a remedy
is only available for a victim’s blood relatives, a court can make a
82. THAYER, supra note 69, at 193; see Monaghan, supra note 80, at 236 (“[I]n
contrast to the generalizing feature of law declaration, law application is situationspecific; any ad hoc norm elaboration is, in theory, like a ticket good for a specific
trip only.”).
83. THAYER, supra note 69, at 194.
84. Warner, supra note 66, at 129.
85. Id. But see JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1927) (arguing that questions of law and fact “are not
two mutually exclusive kinds of questions, based upon a difference of subject-matter,”
for “[m]atters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach
upward, without a break, into matters of law”).
86. Warner, supra note 66, at 129.
87. Id. at 120.
88. Id.
89. See infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text (explaining that if the facts are
disputed and are not already found, and the same decision-maker must find the
underlying historical facts and then make an evaluative determination, those two
steps form a compound question).
90. Warner, supra note 66, at 123–24, 132–33.
91. Id. at 123.
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bright-line rule for what constitutes a blood relative and then apply
92
that definition “mechanically.” Accordingly, whether a remedy is
available under the blood-relative standard would be a pure question
of law because underlying facts would rarely be in dispute.
The third type of mixed question is a compound question, which
contains multiple sub-issues of different categories, including
questions of fact, questions of law, evaluative determinations, and/or
93
definition applications.
For example, whether an event was
proximately caused by an act is a compound question: first, the
decision-maker must determine exactly how the plaintiff was injured
in relation to the defendant’s conduct (a pure question of historical
fact), then the decision-maker must determine if the relationship
between the plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s conduct was
sufficiently foreseeable for a finding of proximate cause (an
94
evaluative determination).
The question therefore remains: how are mixed questions treated?
As a preliminary matter, mixed questions are not simply treated as
questions of law for a court to decide and an appellate court to review
95
de novo.
As Judge Warner describes, compound questions are
properly parsed into their sub-parts, and each part should be
allocated to a decision-making process and given an appropriate
96
standard of review. Most often, these compound questions will have
a compound standard of review; that is, factual findings about the
parties’ conduct or other historical facts are reviewed for clear error,
and the conclusions are either given some amount of deference or
are reviewed de novo, depending on their character, as described
97
below.
With respect to both definition applications and evaluative
92. Id.; see also Monaghan, supra note 80, at 236 (“If all legal propositions could
be formulated in great detail, this function would be rather mechanical and require
no distinctive consideration. But such is not the case. Linking the rule to the
conduct is a complex psychological process, one that often involves judgment.”).
93. Warner, supra note 66, at 136.
94. Cf. id. (explaining that a negligence case overall would be a compound
question because it requires the fact finder to “determine both what happened and
whether, in light of the facts it found, the defendant exercised reasonable care”).
The same could be true for a definition application: the decision-maker may first
need to find the historical facts of the case and then determine if the definition
applies.
95. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 80, at 238 (noting the Supreme Court has not held
“that all questions of law application should be assimilated to law declaration”).
96. See Warner, supra note 66, at 136–37 (highlighting the problems that arise
when various sub-issues that make up a compound question are not separated from
one another).
97. See id. at 140 (citing Maynard v. Nygren, 332 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2003)
(illustrating the proper handling of a compound question on review)).
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determinations, the allocation of decision-making authority and
98
Typically, a true definition
standard of review is not rigid.
application to the facts of a particular case is bound up in the case,
not useful as precedent, and best decided by the fact finder such that
99
it is truly factual in nature and should be reviewed deferentially.
When a definition application question is reviewed de novo, most
often it is because the question was not actually a definition
application, but rather a reformulation of the definition in more
general terms that will apply generally to similar cases, thereby acting
100
as a question of law.
The treatment of evaluative determinations is much more varied.
Evaluative determinations may be treated either as fact or as law and
reviewed under either standard, typically determined solely by policy
considerations about who is the best decision-maker for a particular
101
type of decision, including the “institutional competence of trial
102
judges and appellate judges.”
As such, evaluative determinations
are not presumed to be treated as one type of question or the other,
but are categorized on a case-by-case basis.

98. Monaghan, supra note 80, at 237. As to a subset of decisions about how to
categorize questions as law or fact, inherent differences do not explain the outcomes.
Rather, policy grounds control. Thus, “[t]he real issue is not analytic, but allocative:
what decisionmaker should decide the issue?” Id. (footnotes omitted).
99. Thomas v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 288 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 2002);
Warner, supra note 66, at 135 (citing Barbour v. Browner, 181 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir.
1999)).
100. Warner, supra note 66, at 135.
101. Id. at 130.
102. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 440 (2001);
cf. Allen & Pardo, supra note 62, at 1771 (“[T]he decision to label an issue ‘law’ or
‘fact’ is a functional one based on who should decide it under what standard, and is
not based on the nature of the issue.”). Of course, the basic rule allocating factual
questions and legal questions to two different sets of institutional decision-makers
itself is rooted in policy considerations. For evaluative determinations, however, the
policy consideration itself informs what is treated as fact and what is treated as law.
One special factor that may counsel toward treating an evaluative determination like
a question of law subject to de novo review is if that evaluative determination and its
underlying facts are dispositive of a constitutional question, where the constitutional
norms almost necessarily must be developed through examination of “enough
factually similar situations.” Monaghan, supra note 80, at 273; see Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984) (applying the doctrine
of constitutional fact review to First Amendment claims where the underlying
evaluations were outcome determinative); see also Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 691 (1996) (holding that determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable
cause are reviewed de novo); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112–13 (1995)
(concluding that of the two inquiries “what were the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation” and “given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt
he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave,” necessary to a
“custody” determination for Miranda purposes, the latter is subject to de novo federal
judicial review in habeas proceedings).
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B. Common Questions of Fact in FOIA Cases
Under this basic framework, a close examination of FOIA cases
reveals that they routinely present questions of fact. The most
commonly invoked exemptions to disclosure in response to FOIA
103
requests are exemptions 5, 6, and 7, and these exemptions are
104
likewise prevalent in FOIA disputes that result in litigation.
Accordingly, a discussion of the most frequent types of issues in FOIA
litigation should focus on the questions that arise when records are
withheld under these exemptions. As demonstrated in detail below,
application of these exemptions frequently necessitates resolution of
questions of fact.
1.

Factual questions under exemption 5
Exemption 5 allows the government to withhold records that are
“inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation
105
106
with the agency.”
Although its plain language is far from clear,
the Supreme Court has explained that exemption 5 “simply
107
incorporates civil discovery privileges.”
The three standard
privileges invoked under exemption 5 are the deliberative process
privilege, the attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work-product
108
privilege.
Of those, the deliberative process privilege is the most
109
frequently used to withhold records.
The deliberative process privilege is meant to “prevent injury to the
110
quality of agency decisions.” As a threshold matter, no exemption 5
privilege, including the deliberative process privilege, can apply to a

103. SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010, supra note 44, at 6.
Specifically, this report indicates that 7(C) is one of the three exemptions most often
invoked. The issues in 7(C) cases are similar to the issues arising from the other subparts of exemption 7. As such, the full set of exemption 7 sections will be
considered, all of which pertain to records “compiled for law enforcement
purposes.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006).
104. See List of Freedom of Information Act Cases in Which a Decision Was Rendered in
2009 Including the Disposition of Each Such Case, The Exemption Involved and the Fees,
OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/oip/cy09/09
rendered.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
105. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
106. See, e.g., Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 858 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (calling the language of exemption 5 a “rough guide” to what it is
meant to protect).
107. United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 792, 799 (1984) (citing FTC v.
Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 26 (1983)).
108. Freedom of Information Act Guide: Exemption 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May
2004), http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption5.htm.
109. Id.
110. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 151 (1975).
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record unless it is an inter- or intra-agency record.
Whether the
record is inter- or intra-agency is therefore the first question to be
decided in a deliberative process privilege case. If that initial
threshold is passed, assessment of the deliberative process privilege
requires a two-part inquiry:
(1) the records must be
112
113
“predecisional,” and (2) they must be “deliberative.”
Only
records that meet all three components of this test may be withheld
from the public.
The first threshold question—whether a record is inter- or intraagency—is a compound question involving a question of historical
fact (i.e., between whom was the record shared?) and a question of
interpreting a legal standard (i.e., were those individuals within
agencies as defined by FOIA?). This question of historical fact is
rarely disputed; the government’s account of with whom the record
was shared is difficult for a plaintiff to challenge given judges’
reluctance to grant a FOIA plaintiff discovery on the government
114
agency defendant.
Additionally, the identity of individuals with
whom the record was shared is frequently apparent on the face of the
record, such as a memo from a contractor to a U.S. agency or a
report from one agency to another. The rare case in which the interor intra-agency status of a record is disputed tends to present
questions that demand a statement of more generally applicable law,
such as whether records are still inter- or intra-agency if they are
115
116
prepared at an agency’s request by senators, consultants, or
117
118
witnesses, or if they are shared with litigation adversaries or
111. Dep’t of Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 9
(2001) (“[T]he first condition of Exemption 5 is no less important than the second;
the communication must be ‘inter-agency or intra-agency.’ . . . With exceptions not
relevant here, ‘agency’ means ‘each authority of the Government of the United
States,’ and ‘includes any executive department, military department, Government
corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment in the
executive branch of the Government . . . , or any independent regulatory agency.’”
(citations omitted)).
112. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 151–52.
113. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973), superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(2006); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 867 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
114. See, e.g., Simmons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 796 F.2d 709, 711–12 (4th Cir.
1986) (upholding denial of discovery in FOIA case); Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339,
352 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[In a FOIA case], if these [affidavit] requirements are met,
the district judge has discretion to forgo discovery and award summary judgment on
the basis of affidavits.”).
115. Ryan v. Dep’t of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 789–90 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
116. Lead Indus. Ass’n v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 610 F.2d 70, 83
(2d Cir. 1979).
117. Brockway v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1975).
118. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 612 F. Supp.
1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985).

KWOKA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

236

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/26/2012 8:06 PM

[Vol. 61:217
119

private parties advancing their own interests before the agency.
These types of issues require courts to pronounce generally
applicable rules interpreting the breadth of “inter” or “intra” agency
sharing under the statute and, therefore, may be appropriately
120
resolved as matters of law and reviewed de novo.
By contrast, the other two questions under exemption 5, much
more frequently at issue, are difficult to characterize as anything
other than case-specific factual inquiries or definition applications
that should be treated like a factual inquiries. Whether a record is
“predecisional” is an inquiry of historical fact: was the record created
in anticipation of the decision to which it pertained, as opposed to
created after the decision was made to justify, explain, disagree with,
121
or otherwise discuss that past agency decision? Likewise, whether a
record is “deliberative” concerns whether the material is opinion,
recommendation, or policymaking in nature, as opposed to factual or
122
investigative.
To answer these questions, the decision-maker must
examine how the agency’s administrative process works and the role
123
of the record at issue in that process. The decision-maker will want
to know historical facts, such as from whom the record originated
124
and to whom it was circulated, and whether the document was
125
subsequently adopted as official agency policy.
The nature of the
contents of the record itself will also be important, including whether
the record reflects recommendations, draft material, or opinions, or
whether it is governing agency policy as it affects the public or a mere
119. Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 12
(2001).
120. See Warner, supra note 66, at 133 (explaining that determining a legal
standard is a question of law). This question is indistinguishable from Prima U.S. Inc.
v. Panalpina, Inc., 223 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2000). There, the issue was whether a party
was a “freight forwarder” under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, and the Second
Circuit defined freight forwarders as those parties that do no more than arrange
transportation and thus do not issue a bill of lading and do not consolidate cargo.
Id. at 129. The case did not involve a dispute over the historical facts, but rather over
a general rule that would apply to like cases in the future. See Warner, supra note 66,
at 133 (using Panalpina as an example of a question that may appear to be a
definition application, but is more appropriately viewed as legal interpretation of a
definition).
121. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143–44 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
122. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 89 (1973), superseded by statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(2006).
123. See Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 172–
79 (1975).
124. See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (“The identity of the parties to the memorandum is important; a document
from a subordinate to a superior official is more likely to be predecisional, while a
document moving in the opposite direction is more likely to contain instructions to
staff explaining the reasons for a decision already made.”).
125. See Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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recitation of factual material. Then, the decision-maker will have to
apply those facts to the definitions of “predecisional” and
“deliberative.”
Unlike the question with whom a record was shared outside the
agency, when the question concerns the record’s relationship to an
agency decision, the plaintiff often can produce enough evidence
without discovery to create a genuine dispute of fact based on agency
statements and actions and the plaintiff’s own information about the
127
subject matter. No decision on these issues will produce the type of
statement of law that will apply generally to like cases; these decisions
are completely fact-dependent. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit explained, “[t]he cases
in this area are of limited help to us, because the deliberative process
privilege is so dependent upon the individual document and the role
128
it plays in the administrative process.” The Ninth Circuit has been
more direct: “[T]he present case hinges on whether disclosure of the
requested information would reveal anything about the agency’s
decisional process. This is a fact-based inquiry where deference to
129
the district court’s finding is appropriate.”
It is incorrect to treat
these questions, which constitute the bulk of questions decided in
exemption 5 cases, as questions of law decided by a court and
reviewed de novo. Rather, they are classic, fact-bound definition
applications, typically left to the fact finder and reviewed
130
deferentially.

126. See Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 868.
127. Plaintiffs often know a fair amount about the general nature of the requested
records, which is why, after all, they requested them. See, e.g., McKinley v. FDIC, 744
F. Supp. 2d 128, 138–39 (D.D.C. 2010) (illustrating the plaintiff’s knowledge of the
FDIC records at issue in the case through plaintiff’s argument that the FDIC records
were gathered in a “‘frantic scramble on the evening of March 13, 2008 and in the
early morning of March 14, 2008 to gather as much raw data as possible, not any
careful or considered culling of facts that would reveal the exercise of agency
judgment’”), aff’d sub nom. McKinley v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 647
F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2011); ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 738 F. Supp. 2d 93,
108 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining plaintiff’s argument that withheld records contained
factual information provided to the government “‘during third party interviews
conducted in connection with a review of detainee deaths by the Office of
Inspections in 2007 and 2008’”); Williams & Connolly LLP v. SEC, 729 F. Supp. 2d
202, 213 (D.D.C. 2010) (explaining plaintiff’s argument that the documents “contain
merely factual material such as statements made by Corigliano or Kearney”).
128. Coastal States Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 867.
129. Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.
1992).
130. See Warner, supra note 66, at 135 (concluding that “[o]nly in the rare case,
where strong countervailing policy considerations exist, should a question of
definition application be reviewed de novo”).
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2.

Factual questions under exemptions 6 and 7(C)
Factual disputes also routinely arise in cases involving exemption 6
and exemption 7(C). Exemption 6 covers “personnel and medical
files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a
131
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
Similarly,
exemption 7(C), though it only pertains to records compiled for law
enforcement purposes, covers records the release of which “could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
132
personal privacy.”
Although the threshold issues of whether
133
records are “personnel and medical and similar files” and whether
134
records are “compiled for law enforcement purposes” differ, the
issues that commonly arise in determining whether release of records
would invade personal privacy are very similar.
Both exemptions 6 and 7(C) require the decision-maker to decide
if release of the records would invade personal privacy and whether
135
that invasion would be unwarranted. Normally, whether something
is unwarranted is an evaluative determination, akin to whether
136
Were the categorization
actions are reasonable or in good faith.
that simple, the courts would simply decide whether the privacy issue
presented the type of evaluative determination best left to the fact
137
finder or to an appellate court reviewing de novo. In exemption 6
and 7(C) cases, however, “unwarranted” has been given a substantial
amount of judicial gloss, which has created subsidiary questions
worthy of independent consideration. To conduct an exemption 6 or
7(C) analysis, first, if there is no privacy interest in the records, the
138
exemptions do not apply.
Second, if there is a cognizable privacy
interest, the decision-maker must weigh the privacy interest in the

131. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (2006).
132. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
133. As a practical matter, personnel and medical (and similar) files include just
about anything that pertains to a person, and, as the D.C. Circuit acknowledged, it is
a requirement that “is fairly minimal and is easily satisfied.” Wash. Post Co. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Accordingly,
that issue is rarely seriously disputed in litigation.
134. See infra notes 154–155 and accompanying text (describing the test for “law
enforcement purposes”).
135. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C).
136. See Warner, supra note 66, at 120 (defining “evaluative determination” as
“requir[ing] a decision-maker to exercise judgment” so that “any time an issue uses
words like ‘reasonable’ or ‘fair’” an evaluative determination will be made).
137. See id. at 130 (explaining that evaluative determinations are considered legal
or factual on a case-by-case basis based on policy considerations).
138. See U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600 (1982) (holding
that for the exemption to apply, information must be personal in nature); cf. FCC v.
AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (holding that corporations do not have
“personal privacy” under exemption 7(C) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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records against the public interest in disclosure.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the “personal” nature of
records as critical to the analysis of whether a privacy interest is at
140
stake. The potential effect of releasing the record on the individual
concerned is always a central inquiry, including whether the release
141
may cause harm to the individual or his reputation, whether the
142
release may put the individual in danger of third-party retaliation,
and even (weighing on the side of release) whether the release may
143
lead to some benefit to the individual. These questions fall squarely
in the category of factual inquiries: they are predictive hypothetical
144
factual questions.
They require the decision-maker to determine
what would happen in the event of the record’s release—a question
that necessarily is specific to the kind of record and the circumstances
surrounding the record. Other types of factual inquiries may also be
required to determine if a privacy interest exists. For instance, the
exemption generally reaches records that concern individuals, but
145
not business or professional records.
The line between those
146
categories can be blurry. Thus, whether records fall in one category
or another is naturally a fact-bound inquiry concerning the
139. Although courts balance the same two factors against each other under both
exemptions, the weight accorded to each factor differs. Under exemption 6, which
allows withholding where disclosure “would” result in “clearly unwarranted” invasion
of personal privacy, it takes a comparatively strong privacy interest to outweigh the
public interest in disclosure. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 756 (1989). Under exemption 7(C), however,
withholding is permitted if release “could reasonably be expected to” result in
“unwarranted” invasion of personal privacy, and the balance is much more in favor
of privacy. Id. Although courts weigh the privacy interest differently under
exemptions 6 and 7(C), the nature of the inquiry is the same, and this Article
therefore treats them together.
140. See Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 600.
141. Id.
142. U.S. Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 177 (1991). But see id. at 180 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing that exemption 6 claims should be evaluated on the basis of
what the requested information “reveals” rather than the possible scenarios revelation
may “lead to,” including third-party retaliation).
143. See Lepelletier v. FDIC, 164 F.3d 37, 39, 47–48 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (ordering the
release of bank depositors’ names so that they could recover over three million
dollars in unclaimed funds that would otherwise be forfeited to the FDIC).
144. Cf. Warner, supra note 66, at 117–18 (exemplifying a hypothetical prediction
of fact question as predicting “what the plaintiff’s business would have earned but for
the breach” in a contract case for lost-profit damages).
145. See FCC v. AT&T Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1185 (2011) (holding that
corporations do not have “personal privacy” rights under exemption 7(C)); Sims v.
CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Exemption 6 was developed to protect
intimate details of personal and family life, not business judgments and
relationships.”).
146. See, e.g., Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., No. 05-01908 (HHK), 2006
WL 2320941, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 2006) (examining exemption 6 in the context of
records of a business individually owned or closely held), rev’d in part, 515 F.3d 1224
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
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individual, the nature of the business, and the relationship of the
records to the individual and the business.
The public interest side of the balancing test is no less fact-bound.
The public interest in the release of records is an interest that has
been strictly bounded by judicial interpretation. The only public
interest that matters for the purposes of the exemption 6 and
exemption 7(C) balancing tests is the public’s interest in knowing
147
about the operations and activities of government. Determining if
the release of the record will inform the public about the operations
or activities of government is, like the first prong, a question of
predictive hypothetical fact, not a question of law.
The Supreme Court has attempted to generalize the analysis in a
way that might suggest that the questions are, at their base, legal
questions. In United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for
148
Freedom of the Press, the Court announced that “categorical decisions
may be appropriate and individual circumstances disregarded when a
case fits into a genus in which the balance characteristically tips in
149
one direction.”
Considering the request for the “rap sheet” of a
particular individual, the Court declined to consider any special
circumstances about the individual and considered only the “nature
of the requested document and its relationship” to the recognized
150
public interest.
Using the categorical approach, the Court
concluded that “[t]he privacy interest in maintaining the practical
obscurity of rap-sheet information will always be high,” while the
151
public interest was at its “nadir.”
Despite the Court’s insistence that the proper approach is
“categorical,” which implies the creation of a generally applicable
legal standard, post-Reporters Committee analyses have remained
intensely fact-bound. As the leading FOIA treatise states, “[i]t is
difficult to generalize about whether certain kinds of files are or are
152
not exempt. . . . One must usually proceed by example.” The D.C.
Circuit is equally unconvinced: “[A]ll of these [exemption 6
balancing test] inquiries are fact-intensive, delicate, and far better
suited in the first instance for the ruminations of a single trial judge,

147. U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994);
U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772
(1989); Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976).
148. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
149. Id. at 776.
150. Id. at 772.
151. Id. at 780.
152. HARRY A. HAMMITT ET AL., LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL OPEN GOVERNMENT
LAWS 2010, at 183 (25th ed. 2010).
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expert at finding facts, rather than for the deliberations of a three153
judge committee far more adept at finding fault.”
3.

Factual questions under other parts of exemption 7
Application of exemption 7 likewise necessitates resolving myriad
factual issues. To begin, the threshold qualification for exemption 7
154
is that the records be “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” In
a majority of circuits, even this initial question requires a decisionmaker to determine if the investigation to which the records relate is
for the purpose of enforcing federal law or ensuring national
security, and if there is a “colorable claim” that the investigation is
155
related to the agency’s law enforcement duties.
The purpose for
which a record was created is a question of historical fact, and
whether there is a colorable claim of rationality for the investigation
is most like an evaluative determination. As such, at least half of the
156
threshold exemption 7 inquiry is purely factual.
Exemption 7, furthermore, does not exempt all law enforcement
records from release. Rather, it exempts only those whose release
would cause one of the six identified types of harm that qualify a
157
record for withholding.
One of those, exemption 7(C), covers
153. Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
154. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006).
155. Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 2007)
(per curiam); Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 420–21 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Binion
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 695 F.2d 1189, 1193–94 (9th Cir. 1983) (describing the initial
determination for whether a record falls within exemption 7 as deciding whether a
“rational nexus” exists between law enforcement duties and the document).
156. Again, courts have attempted to categorize claims to some extent. For
instance, the D.C. Circuit has articulated differing standards for agencies whose
“primary function involves law enforcement,” to which the court applies “a more
deferential standard to a claim that information was compiled for law enforcement
purposes,” and for “mixed-function” agencies, whose claims of law enforcement
purposes a court “must scrutinize with some skepticism.” Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294
F.3d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Pratt, 673 F.2d at 418) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Nonetheless, every agency, even agencies with primary functions
involving law enforcement, must make some degree of showing that the records were
compiled for law enforcement purposes. See Pratt, 673 F.2d at 421 (explaining that
although the court may afford deference to primarily law enforcement agencies,
review is not “vacuous”). In any case, that any deference is afforded such agencies in
their assertion of law enforcement purpose is at odds with the plain language of
FOIA, which mandates de novo review of agency withholdings. 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(B).
157. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)–(F) (exempting records compiled for law
enforcement purposes that “(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an
impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to
disclose the identity of a confidential source . . . , (E) would disclose techniques and
procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose
guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure
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The
privacy, discussed above in conjunction with exemption 6.
others can be divided into two categories. The first category
concerns records that, if released, would cause a particular harm,
which is a question of predictive hypothetical fact for a decisionmaker to find. The three exemption 7 subsections that fit into this
first category of causing a particular harm include records that, if
released: “(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a
fair trial or an impartial adjudication, . . . or (F) could reasonably be
159
expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.”
Determining whether the release of a record could reasonably be
expected to interfere with law enforcement requires the decisionmaker to examine the nature of the investigation, the record’s
relationship to the investigation, the likely course of the investigation
in the future, and the possible ways that the public or the requester
160
could use the record to interfere with the investigation. These are
historical and predictive facts that essentially determine the outcome
161
of an exemption claim. For this reason, the Ninth Circuit expressly
could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could
reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual”).
158. See supra notes 139–146 and accompanying text.
159. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A)–(B), (F).
160. See, e.g., Campbell v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.2d 256, 265
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (urging a fact-based analysis and requiring a district court to
conduct a “focused” and “particularized” review of the documentation on which the
government based its claim that releasing the sought-after information would
interfere with the investigation). The nuances of these rules are beyond the scope of
this Article, as this section seeks to demonstrate that questions of fact arise as a
routine matter in FOIA cases. Some generally applicable legal interpretations of
these standards have been enunciated. See, e.g., Juárez v. Dep’t of Justice, 518 F.3d
54, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that for exemption 7(A) to apply, an investigation
does not have to be concrete, but rather can be mere evidence gathering for a
potential case). Furthermore, in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214
(1978), the Supreme Court attempted to “generalize” the inquiry under 7(A), similar
to its treatment of exemption 7(C) in United States Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776 (1989), by allowing courts to
decide that in “particular kinds of enforcement proceedings, disclosure of particular
kinds of investigatory records while a case is pending would generally interfere with
enforcement proceedings,” Robbins, 437 U.S. at 236 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Like Reporters Committee, this attempt at generalization had little effect on
the need for factual determinations under exemption 7(A) as the “kinds of
investigatory records” are both numerous and fact-specific.
161. Although exemption 7(A) authorizes the government to withhold records if
their release “could reasonably be expected to” produce the relevant harm, its
application does not demand an evaluative determination. S. REP. NO. 98-221, at 23
(1983). Rather, “could reasonably be expected to” relieves the decision-maker of the
need to meet the exacting standard of a concrete prediction, and was “intended to
clarify the degree of risk of harm from disclosure which must be shown to justify
withholding.” Id. Therefore, it is not a question of subjective or objective
determinations, but rather how certain the fact finder must be that the harm will
occur.

KWOKA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT TRIAL

3/26/2012 8:06 PM

243

treated one district court’s determination that revealing a certain
report could reasonably be expected to interfere with a government
162
Other harm-predicting
investigation as a factual determination.
163
subsections of exemption 7 require similar inquiries.
The second category of exemption 7 subsections concerns specific
types of information and allows withholding of records the release of
which “(D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a
confidential source, . . . (E) would disclose techniques and
procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or
would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk
164
circumvention of the law.” The decision-maker applying these two
subsections would need to engage in a fact-bound definition
application. For instance, the decision-maker would need to answer
the question, “Do the records contain ‘the identity of a confidential
165
source?’”
Given that the Supreme Court defined confidential
sources to include any source where the information was provided
“with the understanding that the [law enforcement agency] would
not divulge the communications except to the extent . . . necessary
166
for law enforcement purposes,” deciding whether a source is
confidential requires a fact finder to determine the source’s prior
167
mental state—a question of historical fact.
In sum, a close look at the questions that decision-makers must
162. Lion Raisins Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 354 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“The district court’s application of [exemption 7(A)] in this case was grounded in
its findings of fact.”).
163. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(B), (F); ACLU v. Dep’t of Def., 543 F.3d 59, 68 (2d
Cir. 2008) (explaining that exemption 7(F) requires a showing of expected danger
to an identifiable individual or group of individuals), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 777 (2009)
(mem.); Wash. Post Co. v. Dep’t of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(describing exemption 7(B) as “meant to prevent disclosures from conferring an
unfair advantage upon one party to an adversary proceeding or leading to prejudicial
publicity in pending cases that might inflame jurors or distort administrative
judgment”).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D)–(E).
165. Id. § 552(b)(7)(D).
166. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 174 (1993).
167. See Warner, supra note 66, at 117 (noting that because the only direct
evidence of a person’s mental state, an inquiry of historical fact, is her own
testimony, “circumstantial evidence is almost always necessary to prove such historical
facts”). Although it may seem impossible for a fact finder to determine the exact
mental state of the source, the Supreme Court in Landano held that a court could
consider various types of evidence to determine the source’s belief that the
statements would be kept confidential, including the agency’s statements, any
promises of confidentiality, whether the informant was paid, the nature of the
relationship between the informant and the agency (including where and when
meetings and information exchange would take place), the nature of the crime at
issue, and the source’s relationship to the crime. Landano, 508 U.S. at 172, 179.
These questions, too, are questions of fact.
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answer with respect to the most commonly invoked exemptions to
disclosure reveal that factual issues in FOIA cases arise routinely.
Many of those factual issues are pure issues of historical or predictive
fact—not even the type of question often thought of as a “mixed”
question. Others are definition applications that are fact-bound,
typically left to the fact finder, and reviewed deferentially.
III. TREATMENT OF FACTUAL DISPUTES IN FOIA VERSUS NON-FOIA
LAWSUITS
As described above, FOIA cases involve myriad factual disputes that
arise under some of the most commonly claimed exemptions.
Therefore, there is every reason to think that FOIA cases would, like
other civil cases, result in a significant number of trials at which
factual disputes are resolved. Yet, an examination of summary
judgment procedures in FOIA cases, empirical evidence of FOIA
dispositions, and standards of review in FOIA cases demonstrate that
FOIA cases are not treated like other civil cases. In fact, the special
treatment of FOIA cases results in virtually no FOIA trials.
A. Rule 56 as Applied to FOIA Cases
An examination of cases decided on summary judgment,
particularly the unique procedures designed by courts for FOIA
cases, demonstrates that genuine factual disputes are routinely
decided at the summary judgment stage. This practice is contrary to
168
the express commands of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under Rule 56, summary judgment may be granted to a party only
when the court concludes that there is “no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
169
law.”
As a practical matter, this standard suggests summary
judgment can be granted in two circumstances. First, summary
judgment is appropriate when the parties do not dispute material
170
facts and the only issues presented are questions of law.
Second,
summary judgment is appropriate even when factual disputes may
exist, so long as there is no factual dispute that is both “genuine” and
171
“material.”
As to the second type of summary judgment grant, a genuine
dispute means that there is more than the “mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence” on both sides, and a material dispute is one that
168.
169.
170.
171.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
Id.
Id.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
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would affect the outcome of the case (or, for partial summary
judgment, would affect resolution of the issue on which summary
172
This type of summary judgment decision
judgment is sought).
requires the court to assess the sufficiency of the evidence. If there is
insufficient evidence to allow a reasonable fact finder to rule in favor
of the non-moving party, summary judgment for the moving party is
173
appropriate.
Importantly, under Rule 56(d), a court may deny a
summary judgment motion where the opposing party has presented
an adequate reason for its inability to present evidence necessary to
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, including inadequate
174
opportunity for discovery.
If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, that
party can win a motion for summary judgment merely by
demonstrating a lack of evidence on any single essential element of
175
the case that the non-moving party must establish.
That is, if the
plaintiff has the burden of proof and the defendant moves for
summary judgment—the most typical scenario—the defendant need
only show that the plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence on any
176
single element of the claim.
Thus, in a negligence case in which
the plaintiff must show duty, breach, causation, and damages, the
defendant is entitled to summary judgment if it can show that the
plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence on any one of those four elements.
On the other hand, if the moving party has the burden of proof at
trial, that party—typically the plaintiff—must demonstrate sufficient
undisputed evidence to meet the burden on each element of the
claim. Even then, summary judgment will be defeated if the nonmoving party (who does not have the burden of proof at trial)
177
demonstrates a genuine dispute as to any one of those elements. As
a result, it is much more difficult for the party with the burden of
178
proof at trial to win a motion for summary judgment.
172. Id. at 248, 252.
173. Id. at 248.
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d), 28 U.S.C. app. r. 56(d) (Supp. III 2010) (amended
2010).
175. Especially after Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), which holds that a
defendant need not prove the non-existence of an essential element but must point
to a lack of evidence as to the plaintiff’s claim, id. at 322–23, exactly what the
defendant has to do to demonstrate this lack of evidence is a matter of some debate.
See Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary
Judgment Burdens Twenty Years After The Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81, 119-21
(2006).
176. Steinman, supra note 175, at 98.
177. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
178. See Trautmann v. Cogema Mining, Inc., No. 5:04-cv-117, 2006 WL 2716156, at
*2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2006) (explaining that the summary judgment burden is
heavier on a moving party when that party bears the burden of proof at trial).
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Unlike typical civil litigation in which the plaintiff bears the burden
of proving the merits of the claim, in a FOIA case, the government
defendant bears the burden of proof that a withheld record falls
179
Accordingly, it is
within one of FOIA’s exemptions to disclosure.
the government that, by law (if not in practice), has the more difficult
task at the summary judgment stage of FOIA lawsuits.
Importantly, a court considering motions for summary judgment is
charged to decide only whether evidence is sufficient to permit a jury
180
to find for the non-moving party, which is a question of law.
The
court is not permitted to “weigh the evidence and determine the
181
That is, the court cannot make factual
truth of the matter” itself.
determinations when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to FOIA cases
as they do in all other federal civil litigation, courts have fashioned
unique procedures for FOIA cases. First, although the government
possesses most (if not all) of the information relevant to the lawsuit,
182
discovery is disfavored and rarely granted to a FOIA plaintiff. This
trend is particularly troubling in light of the D.C. Circuit’s
acknowledgement that “[t]his lack of knowledge by the party seeking
disclosure seriously distorts the traditional adversary nature of our
183
legal system’s form of dispute resolution.”
Rather than require
strict adherence to normal discovery rules, however, the D.C. Circuit
184
in Vaughn v. Rosen outlined a new procedure, now known as the
Vaughn index, under which the government must produce a detailed
affidavit indexing the withheld records and giving a justification for
185
each record’s withholding.
Another way courts can overcome some of the information
imbalance unique to FOIA litigation is to review in camera the
186
requested records at issue.
Although the district court has broad
statutory authority to use this procedure to test claims of exemption,
courts have mostly declined to require it, and, because there is no
absolute right to in camera inspection in any given circumstance, it is
187
difficult for a plaintiff to compel a court to use this method. Where
179. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006).
180. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
181. Id. at 249.
182. HAMMITT ET AL., supra note 152, at 390; see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 64 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying plaintiff’s request for
discovery).
183. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
184. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
185. Id. at 826–27.
186. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006).
187. See Spirko v. U.S. Postal Serv., 147 F.3d 992, 996–97 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting
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the records are voluminous and review of all the records would be
burdensome, courts can also conduct in camera review using a
188
sampling procedure.
In camera review cannot, of course, help a judge determine
matters extrinsic to the document, including the circumstances of its
creation or use. Additionally, in camera review may not reveal any
indication of harm that might result from the document’s release.
Vaughn indices do provide some of the relevant extrinsic information,
but they do not give the plaintiff the opportunity to do much more
than point out any deficiencies or discrepancies in the descriptions of
the records. Unless the plaintiff happens to have contrary evidence
gathered from some other source, the government’s assertions in the
Vaughn index go largely unchallenged, assuming they are adequately
detailed. Although courts may normally require a plaintiff to have a
certain quantum of evidence creating a genuine dispute, in the case
of information imbalance with no real opportunity for discovery, one
might expect a court to lower the plaintiff’s burden in opposing the
government’s motion for summary judgment and be more hesitant
than usual to grant summary judgment to the government.
But the reality is to the contrary. In FOIA cases decided on
summary judgment, courts often give deference to the government’s
characterization of the records and make factual findings in the
189
government’s favor even when disputed evidence exists.
For
190
instance, in Access Reports v. Department of Justice, the D.C. Circuit
reversed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the
plaintiff based on the government’s failure to meet its burden to
justify withholding under exemption 5’s deliberative process
191
privilege, noting:
The question remains whether the memo as a whole is
“predecisional”. Here, the memo . . . [appears] postdecisional . . . :
the district court’s broad discretion to view records in camera or to decline to do so).
188. Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
189. See generally Rebecca Silver, Comment, Standard of Review in FOIA Appeals and
the Misuse of Summary Judgment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 731, 735–40 (2006) (describing the
circuit split on the appropriate standard of review for summary judgment decisions
in FOIA cases and providing some hypotheses for why the split exists). Although
Silver’s analysis involves an assertion that factual disputes exist in FOIA cases and that
those issues are overlooked in courts’ rush to decide FOIA cases on summary
judgment, unlike this Article, Silver does not analyze what questions in FOIA cases
are properly categorized as questions of fact, attempt an empirical demonstration
that summary judgment is overused in FOIA cases, or delve into the ways in which
the failure of courts to acknowledge factual disputes in FOIA cases necessitating trials
disadvantages requesters and hinders the realization of FOIA’s transparency
objectives.
190. 926 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
191. Id. at 1193.
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Robinson prepared the memo to help his superiors in the process
of defending the legislative package that the Department had
already offered. But Robinson’s chiefs never asked him . . . to
“explain” the decision to initiate a legislative proposal. They
certainly did not seek his work as a draft or some sort of agency
192
“working law” on when to offer FOIA amendments . . . .

The court’s analysis is difficult to characterize in any way other
than weighing the evidence and making factual findings. On the one
hand, some evidence showed the records at issue purported to justify
an agency decision that was already made and explain how a variety
of cases should come out under that decision, while other evidence
tended to indicate the records were prepared more as “talking
193
points” for handling upcoming questioning on agency policy.
Competing evidence therefore existed, and the appellate court made
its own factual finding regarding the agency’s use of the records
rather than denying summary judgment to both parties and ordering
a trial take place for the purpose of fact finding. Not only were these
statements made in the context of a summary judgment decision,
they were made by a court of appeals reversing the district court’s
decision, thereby substituting the appellate court’s factual
determinations for the factual determinations made in the first
instance by the district court.
In another case, the D.C. Circuit, again overturning the district
194
court’s grant of summary judgment to the plaintiff, considered the
government’s claim that release of the records would interfere with a
law enforcement investigation:
[W]e hold that the government’s expectation that disclosure of the
detainees’ names would enable al Qaeda or other terrorist groups
to map the course of the investigation and thus develop the means
to impede it is reasonable. A complete list of names informing
terrorists of every suspect detained by the government at any point
during the September 11 investigation would give terrorist
organizations a composite picture of the government investigation,
and since these organizations would generally know the activities
and locations of its members on or about September 11, disclosure
would inform terrorists of both the substantive and geographic
focus of the investigation. Moreover, disclosure would inform
192. Id. at 1196.
193. See id. (noting that “[b]ecause the memo explores how a set of cases might
play out under the Department’s proposals, it may look like a guide to decision of
future cases and thus a kind of agency law,” but then concluding instead that the
memo was in fact prepared in part as “ammunition for the expected fray”).
194. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 920 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
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terrorists which of their members were compromised by the
investigation, and which were not. This information could allow
terrorists to better evade the ongoing investigation and more easily
195
formulate or revise counter-efforts.

Here, again, the appellate court has substituted its own view of the
questions of predictive hypothetical fact posed by the case for the
district court’s determination, and both courts have claimed to
decide the case as a matter of law under a summary judgment
standard.
Examples like these are not hard to find. Many FOIA summary
judgment decisions contain what appear to be factual findings, often
196
concerning the factual questions identified above in Part II.
In
many instances, the factual findings may not appear contested, but
the plaintiff had very little opportunity to discover contrary evidence.
In others, such as in Access Reports, contrary evidence is discussed,
197
weighed, and rejected at the summary judgment stage. Either way,
the special procedures developed uniquely for FOIA and the
summary judgment decisions that contain factual findings offer
evidence that FOIA cases are not being ordered to proceed to trial
like other civil cases with genuine, material factual disputes.
B. Empirical Analysis of FOIA Dispositions
To lend empirical support to this Article’s contention that judges
regularly convert questions of fact into questions of law in FOIA
cases, I focused on the following questions: (1) How many FOIA
trials are there?; (2) Are FOIA trials any rarer than trials in other civil
cases, which we know occur less and less frequently?; and (3) If the
FOIA trial rate is lower than the trial rate in other civil cases, is it the
result of an increased rate of adjudication of all issues in the case as a
matter of law or for some other reason, such as a higher-than-average

195. Id. at 928. This case was also noteworthy because, for the first time, it gave
deference to the government’s harm prediction under exemption 7(A), a deference
that had typically been reserved for national security exemption claims under
exemption 1 (exempting properly classified records) and exemption 3
(incorporating a statutory exemption for CIA intelligence sources and methods), not
law enforcement record claims. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (3) (2006); 50
U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) (protecting from disclosure CIA “intelligence sources and
methods”); ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(recognizing that 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1) is an exemption 3 statute). This type of
deference also contradicts FOIA’s mandate that the district court review
withholdings de novo. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (establishing de novo judicial
review of agency withholdings).
196. See supra Part II.B (delineating the factual questions that arise under FOIA
exemptions 5, 6, and 7).
197. Access Reports, 926 F.2d at 1193–94.
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settlement rate? This Part attempts to answer these questions.
1.

Description of data
I used data collected by individual district courts clerks’ offices that
is reported to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and
198
The
assembled by the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC Database”).
FJC Database contains data reported on each individual federal court
case, including the parties’ names, the docket number, the filing and
termination dates, the nature of the lawsuit (case type), the type of
199
disposition, the prevailing party, and the amount of the judgment.
The field that describes the nature of the lawsuit is important for
comparing FOIA cases to other civil cases. The FJC Database uses
one code to designate cases brought under FOIA, and those cases are
200
therefore easily identified. FOIA cases began appearing in the FJC
201
In addition to FOIA cases, approximately one
Database in 1977.
198. FJC Database, supra note 59. Specifically, within the FJC Database, I used the
Civil Terminations portion of the data, which describes data for all civil cases that
were terminated, rather than pending civil cases. It does not include any criminal
case data.
199. Id.
200. This code is “nature of suit 895.” Code 895 also includes cases brought under
the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). Privacy Act cases are far less common but
involve similar questions of whether certain government-held records are exempt
from disclosure; the most significant differences are that a Privacy Act claim can only
be made by the person whom the records concern and that the Privacy Act mandates
certain recordkeeping practices. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). The exemptions under the
Privacy Act closely track or incorporate by reference the FOIA exemptions. For
example, like FOIA, the Privacy Act exempts investigatory material compiled for law
enforcement purposes and incorporates FOIA’s exemption of properly classified
material. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(1)–(2). Because the questions that arise in deciding
FOIA claims and Privacy Act claims are similar, the Privacy Act data do not
meaningfully corrupt the FOIA data.
201. Although the original Freedom of Information Act was enacted in 1966 and
went into effect in 1967, the FOIA nature of suit code refers to the Freedom of
Information Act of 1974, which is when the Act was substantially overhauled and
took a form similar to its present form. Freedom of Information Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93–502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
Under the original 1966 Act, agencies found myriad ways of avoiding compliance
with Congressional intent in enacting FOIA, and courts construed some exemptions
very broadly. See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 1798 n.72 (citing high fees, long delays,
and evasive responses as methods of agency evasion, and court decisions on law
enforcement and national security exemptions as overly broad). In the 1974 Act,
Congress imposed many more restrictions on agencies, including deadlines for
agency compliance and limits on fees agencies could charge; gave many more rights
to requesters seeking judicial review, including a de novo standard of review in
litigation and the right to attorneys’ fees in the successful prosecution of a FOIA
case; and substantively limited some of the exemptions that were subject to abuse.
Id. So unprecedented was this type of access to government records that Justice
Antonin Scalia, at the time a law professor at the University of Chicago, proclaimed
that the 1974 amendments
can in fact only be understood as the product of the extraordinary era that
produced them—when “public interest law,” “consumerism,” and
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hundred other “nature of suit” codes appear in the FJC Database, in
202
I have excluded
categories such as torts to land and antitrust.
certain nature of suit categories from the group of non-FOIA civil
cases used for comparison in this Article because of their tendency to
203
skew the data on case resolution.
The other FJC Database field of primary concern to this Article is
the disposition field, which describes how the case was terminated.
The disposition field did not take a form useful to this Article until
204
1979, but it has been continually reported since then. Although the
“investigative journalism” were at their zenith, public trust in the
government at its nadir, and the executive branch and Congress functioning
more like two separate governments than two branches of the same.
Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr.
1982, at 15. With some lag, perhaps in reporting or in the commencement of suits
under the 1974 Act, FOIA cases do not begin to appear in the FJC Database until
1977. FJC Database, supra note 59.
202. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., Federal Court Cases: Integrated Database (1979–2008),
Codebook for Civil Terminations Data, 1979-2008 (Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research, University of Michigan) [hereinafter FJC Database
Codebooks]. To access the Codebook for any given dataset, go to the website listed
supra note 59, click on the desired dataset, and then download the folder containing
the files for that dataset. These files are also available upon request from the author
and are on file with the Law Review.
203. Those excluded categories include prisoner petitions, government recovery
of overpayment of public benefits, and government recovery of defaulted student
loans, represented by nature of suit codes 150, 151, 152, 153, 510, 520, 530, 535, 540,
550, and 555. Prisoner cases tend to have a very high rate of dismissal because of
frivolous filings and denials of petitions to proceed in forma pauperis, and
government cases to collect benefit overpayments or student loan debt tend to have
high default rates. Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements,
Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil
Cases, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 713 n.10 (2004); see also Joe S. Cecil et al., A
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 861, 877, 881 n.60 (2007) (noting the exclusion of prisoner cases from
summary judgment rates). Because those categories of cases tend to be nonadversarial or uncontested, excluding those cases prevents the distortion of results
about the outcomes of federal civil litigation. Hadfield, supra, at 713.
204. Although disposition was reported in 1970, that year is prior to any reported
FOIA cases, making that year’s data irrelevant to this Article. See FJC Database 1970,
supra note 59. From 1971 to 1978 the FJC Database does not report a disposition
field at all. Rather, researchers have been able to reconstruct a rough categorization
of dispositions between those dates by combining the information contained in the
procedural progress field and the “judgment for” field. E.g., Hadfield, supra note
203, at 708. When looking to identify how many trials have occurred, for some
researchers it has been appropriate to count cases in which a “judgment for” a party
was reached during or after a “trial.” E.g., id. For instance, if the researcher seeks to
understand the use of judicial resources, such a definition of disposition by “trial”
might be appropriate. Id. That count includes, however, dispositions by motion that
occur during or after a trial, such as disposition by directed verdict. For the purposes
of this Article, that method would over-count the relevant trials and under-count the
relevant motions resolutions because a case that is disposed of by directed verdict is
resolved by a standard that mirrors the summary judgment standard. FED. R. CIV. P.
50. Thus, re-creating the 1971 to 1978 data in this fashion would be inappropriate.
Moreover, it would only add two years of data for FOIA dispositions, because no
FOIA cases are reported until 1977. I have therefore decided to limit the data to the
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number of disposition categories has changed twice, the categories
205
used in this Article have remained constant. The codes that reflect
trials have consistently been “judgment on jury trial” and “judgment
206
on court trial” since the 1979 coding began.
For the purposes of
this Article, when calculating the trial rates for FOIA cases and other
civil cases, a jury trial and a bench trial are equivalent. Both types of
trials indicate that summary judgment dispositions were
inappropriate; that is, the court found there were genuine disputes of
material fact and that judgment as a matter of law was therefore
207
unwarranted. Whether a denial of summary judgment results in a
208
bench or jury trial is determined by the type of claim at issue. This
reported data beginning in 1979, which encompasses nearly all known FOIA
dispositions and more accurately counts FOIA trials.
205. From 1979 to 1986, the disposition field contained twelve codes: transferred
to another district; remanded; dismissed for want of prosecution; dismissed,
discontinued, settled, withdrawn, etc.; judgment on default; judgment on consent;
judgment on motion before trial; judgment on jury verdict; judgment on directed
verdict; judgment on court trial; judgment on other; and, starting in 1984, statistical
closing. FJC Database Codebooks 1979–1986, supra note 202. In 1987, the number
of codes expanded to nineteen. All of the previous codes remained, except:
“remanded” expanded to two categories, “remanded to state court” and “remanded
to U.S. agency”; “dismissed, discontinued, settled, withdrawn, etc.,” expanded to four
codes for dismissal, including dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, dismissed:
voluntarily, dismissed: settled, and dismissed: other; two judgment categories were
added, including judgment on award of arbitrator and judgment on trial de novo
after arbitration; and a code for multi-district litigation transfer was introduced. FJC
Database Codebooks 1987–1990, supra note 202. Furthermore, in 1991, codes for
appeal affirmed from a magistrate and appeal denied from a magistrate were added.
FJC Database Codebooks 1991–2008, supra note 202.
206. These are codes 7 and 9, respectively, in the disposition field. Clerks’ offices
are instructed to report code 7 when “[t]he action was disposed of by entry of a final
judgment resulting from a verdict by a jury (other than a directed verdict)” and code
9 when “[t]he action was disposed of by entry of a final judgment resulting from a
decision by a judge or magistrate judge during or after a trial (other than a jury
trial).” TRAINING & SUPPORT DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL
STATISTICAL REPORTING GUIDE 3:19 (version 2.1 July 1999).
207. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
208. Whether a litigant has a right to a jury trial is a complex question. As a
constitutional matter, only litigants advancing claims for monetary damages or other
claims comparable to a common law suit historically tried in a court of law are
entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, and even then, such litigants
are not entitled to a jury trial if the claims are made against the United States or
brought in state court. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of a trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”); FED. R. CIV.
P. 38(a)–(b) (preserving a right to a jury trial in federal courts, while also allowing a
party to opt to proceed by bench trial); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517
U.S. 370, 376 (1996) (“[W]e ask, first, whether we are dealing with a cause of action
that either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least analogous to one
that was.”); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (holding that sovereign
immunity dictates that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to claims against
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Article, however, is concerned only with the question whether factual
questions were deemed to exist in the case, such that an evidentiary
trial was necessary, regardless of the type of trial appropriate for the
claim. As such, to calculate the trial rates, I combine bench trials and
209
jury trials.
Gillian Hadfield, professor of law and economics at the University
of Southern California, conducted an audit of the FJC data
disposition codes by comparing them to Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) court system records and demonstrated
210
that these two trial codes are highly accurate. Each of these codes
has very few “type 1” errors—the mistaken inclusion of cases that
211
were disposed of in other, non-trial ways. Moreover, audits of other
codes, including some of the most suspect and ambiguous disposition
codes, indicate relatively few “type 2” errors—the failure to include
212
actual trial adjudications in the trial adjudication categories.
The
United States); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192 (1974) (noting the Seventh
Amendment has not been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to
apply to suits brought in state court).
209. Other empirical studies have likewise combined these two categories to
achieve a single trial rate across types of cases. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 429, 435 (2004). I have not included certain dispositions in my “trial
rate” that other researchers have included. One notable code I have not included in
the “trial rate” is directed verdicts. The differences in choice are a result of
difference in purpose. For instance, Hadfield included directed verdicts in some
descriptions of the trial rates because a directed verdict would indicate that a trial or
some part of a trial had taken place. Hadfield, supra note 203, at 713 tbl.1. Hadfield
was trying to compare trial rates to settlement rates. Id. For this Article’s purposes,
however, inclusion of directed verdicts would be inappropriate because a directed
verdict indicates that the court decided the case as a matter of law and concluded
that no factual determinations were necessary to resolve the case. See FED. R. CIV. P.
50 (allowing judgment as a matter of law when a reasonable jury would not have a
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue). Directed
verdicts are therefore more appropriately grouped with summary judgment motions,
because the motions are decided on the same standard, just at a different point in
the procedural progress of the case.
210. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil
Litigation: Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of
Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1306 (2005).
211. For disposition code 9, judgment on court trial, almost 90% of the cases were
actually disposed of by bench decisions, and the most significant wrongly included
group was jury trials or directed verdicts. Id. For disposition codes 7 and 8, jury
verdict and directed verdict, which were reported by Hadfield together, well over
90% were accurate, and again, non-trial adjudications were rarely wrongly included.
Id.
212. Id. at 1307–11. Hadfield audited code 6, judgment on motion before trial;
code 17, judgment on other; code 12, dismissed: voluntary; code 13, dismissed:
settled; and code 14, dismissed: other. The only significant number of hidden trials
Hadfield found were coded in disposition code “judgment: other,” but even those
were only significant for categories of cases where plaintiff and defendant were both
organizations. Id. at 1308–09. For cases between individuals, there were no hidden
bench trials, between individuals and organizations, somewhere between 2% and
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use of these codes is therefore a reliable count of trials in FOIA cases
and other civil cases.
In addition to the trial rate, it is important to compare the rate of
motion adjudications between FOIA cases and other civil cases. Even
if FOIA trials are significantly less frequent than trials in other civil
cases, that fact would not necessarily indicate that courts are
converting questions of law into questions of fact if, for instance,
FOIA cases more often settled for some reason. Motion adjudications
from 1979 to 2008 have consistently been categorized under the
213
disposition code for “judgment on motion before trial.”
This
disposition code, also audited by Hadfield, although not as reliable as
the trial codes, is still “reasonably reliable” as indicating that the cases
214
were decided by contested motion prior to trial.
The judgment on motion code nonetheless suffers from some
limitations. It is not a code used solely to designate summary
judgment dispositions. Rather, it includes all cases that were
“disposed of by a final judgment based on a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, as defined in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)];
a motion for summary judgment, as defined in [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56]; [or] any other contested motion which results in
4.3% were hidden bench trials, and for organizational parties on both sides, 8.1%
bench trials. Id. at 1308 tbl.8. As for dismissal codes and the code for judgment on
motion before trial, Hadfield found that these codes either do not hide trials or hide
only small numbers of them. Id. at 1307–11.
The only other codes that may be hiding trials are appeal affirmed and
appeal denied from a decision of the magistrate judge, codes that were not
introduced until 1991. FJC Database Codebook 1991, supra note 202. These codes,
however, are highly ambiguous. First, these codes would include appeals from a
magistrate judge’s decisions on any basis, including both decisions on motion and
decisions after trial. Hadfield, supra note 203, at 716. Second, in 1991 the codebook
indicated only that these codes applied when the district court was functioning as an
appellate body, but in 1996 clarified that the codes counted only appeals from
magistrate decisions. FJC Database Codebook 1991, supra note 202. It is unclear if,
between 1991 and 1996 it also counted appeals from administrative decisions.
Hadfield, supra note 203, at 716 n.12. Thus, inclusion of appeals from magistrate
judge rulings may over-count trials and failure to include them may under-count
trials. Id. Although this may be very significant for longitudinal studies about the
trial rate, it is not a concern here. See id. at 715 (reporting data that tends to
illustrate appeals from magistrate judges may explain some of the “disappearing”
court trials). I omit these fields so as to be cautious about over-counting trials, but I
do so consistently for FOIA cases and other civil cases. Accordingly, the undercounting, if it is present, is the same for both groups of interest.
213. Judgment on motion before trial is disposition code 6.
214. Hadfield, supra note 210, at 1307. Although disposition code 6 does not hide
cases mistakenly coded as trials, it does hide a fair number of settlements, nonfinal
judgments, and default judgments. Id. at 1307–08. This code is still far more reliable
than codes purporting to represent voluntary dismissals or settlements and thus is
the best of the available test to determine whether judges are converting questions of
fact into questions of law in FOIA cases. See generally Hadfield, supra note 203, at
723–28 (describing comparatively high accuracy in the codes for trials and motions).
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215

disposition before trial.”
That last category most likely consists
primarily of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
216
Although this Article
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
focuses on summary judgment resolution of FOIA cases, the inclusion
of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and motions for
judgment on the pleadings does not preclude use of the data. All
three motions included within the disposition code are judgments as
a matter of law based on a test of the elements of the claims and
defenses at issue, and any such disposition is precluded if the court
determines that there are genuine issues of material fact. These
dispositions are the products of adversarial processes, rather than
dispositions that arise from settlement or the failure of one party to
meet a procedural requirement. Thus, although the disposition code
for motions cannot be used to represent absolute numbers of
summary judgment motion dispositions, the code can at least provide
215. TRAINING & SUPPORT DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 206,
at 3:19. This disposition code also includes “any order dismissing a prisoner
petition,” a designation that would not bear on the statistics used in this Article
because prisoner litigation has been removed from the database for other reasons
described above. Hadfield, supra, note 203; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our
Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and Inference in Searching for the Causes and
Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571, 580
(2004) (describing limitations of disposition code 6 with respect to measuring
summary judgment dispositions).
216. There is ambiguity as to what dispositions fall within “any other contested
motion which results in disposition before trial.” Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing
Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or
Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 611 n.83 (2004). The structure of the
CIVIL STATISTICAL REPORTING GUIDE’s dispositions guidance to clerks’ offices,
however, breaks down types of dispositions into broad categories that provide insight
into the use of the motions code. See TRAINING & SUPPORT DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, supra note 206, at 3:19. One category heading is for “dismissals,” which
includes several dismissal codes tending to encompass various types of procedural
dismissals and a final code for “any other dismissal not covered by the preceding
categories.” See id. (listing categories including dismissal for want of prosecution,
dismissal for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, voluntary dismissal, and
dismissal after settlement). A separate category heading for judgments lists those
types of dispositions that generally concern the merits and would usually have
prejudicial effect, including dispositions by trial, default judgments, consent
judgments, and judgments by an arbitrator. Id. It is in this judgments category that
disposition code 6 is explained as quoted in the text above. Accordingly, Rule
12(b)(6) motions, a determination typically considered to be on the merits, are most
likely properly classified in the “motion before trial” code in the judgments section
rather than the “other dismissals” code listed in the dismissals category. Moreover,
other types of dismissals, including some other Rule 12(b) dismissals, are specifically
enumerated in the dismissals category, making Rule 12(b)(6) motions the most likely
type of motion to be included in the “any other contested motion” clause of the
motions category. Id. Other researchers have also concluded that Rule 12(b)(6)
motions are most likely included within the judgment on motion before trial
disposition code 6. See Burbank, supra, at 610–11 & n.83 (noting that the Civil
Statutory Reporting Guide suggests overlap and confusion between codes for
“Dismissed Cases” and judgments on “Motions Before Trial”).
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a basis for a relative comparison between categories of cases. At a
minimum, the data bears directly on the question of the rate at which
FOIA cases are disposed as a matter of law rather than by trial, and I
use the data recognizing this limitation.
Given that the category I compare to the trial rate encompasses all
motion adjudication of cases, I have added into this category all cases
decided on directed verdict because the standard for a directed
217
verdict mirrors the summary judgment standard. As such, to get an
accurate sense of the number of cases decided by a court as a matter
of law, judgment on motion and directed verdict cases are treated as
218
one.
2.

FOIA dispositions over thirty years
Determining how many FOIA trials are taking place is
straightforward. Compiled from the 1979 to 2008 databases, the
table below indicates the number of FOIA cases disposed of each
year, the number of FOIA cases disposed of by trial each year, and
the percentage of FOIA dispositions that were by trial.

Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Number of FOIA
Cases
Terminated
457
558
530
450
429
466
573
567
453
397
354
327
341

Number of FOIA
Trials
6
10
14
11
5
4
5
5
3
4
1
1
2

Percent of FOIA
Cases Disposed of
by Trial
1.31%
1.79%
2.64%
2.44%
1.17%
0.86%
0.87%
0.88%
0.66%
1.01%
0.28%
0.31%
0.59%

217. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 50 (stating the standard for Rule 50 is “a reasonable
jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that
issue”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (stating the standard as “no genuine issue as to any
material fact”).
218. That is, I have combined disposition codes 6 and 8 into one motion decision
category.
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500
464
485
508
448
410
415
364
339
348
277
262
300
410
315
302
295
12,344

3
3
4
0
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
1
88

257
0.60%
0.65%
0.82%
0.00%
0.45%
0.24%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.76%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.33%
0.34%
0.71%

Of the eighty-eight trials reported among cases labeled as FOIA
219
cases, eighty-six were bench trials and two were jury trials. Because
220
litigants in FOIA cases have no right to a jury trial, the two jury trials
reported likely represent error. Nonetheless, I have included those
two reported jury trials in the total trial figure for the purpose of
comparing these overall trial rates to the trial rates in civil cases
generally, as I discuss below. There is no reason to believe that the
error rates in disposition data for FOIA cases differ meaningfully
from the error rates in disposition data for civil cases generally. If I
221
were to correct for known error in the FOIA cases but not in the
broader category of civil cases, the comparison between the two
groups would be less accurate. The overall trial rate among FOIA
cases in thirty years of reported data makes clear that there are, in
fact, extremely few trials. In recent years, it is fair to say there have
219. FJC Database, supra note 59.
220. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (holding that sovereign
immunity dictates that the Seventh Amendment does not apply to claims against
United States); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (lack of statutory provision for jury
trial).
221. The known errors are not limited to the two jury trial cases. As I discuss
below, an examination of the PACER records reveals some error in FOIA trial
reporting that would lower the FOIA trial rate even further. See infra Part IV.A
(discussing records from particular FOIA cases coded as disposed by trial verdict).
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222

been essentially no FOIA trials.
The relevant inquiry, however, does not end with FOIA cases. Even
though FOIA trials are rare and have decreased significantly over
223
time, the same might be said for civil trials generally.
I thus
conducted a comparison of the statistical differences between the
rates of trials in FOIA cases and the rates of trials in other civil cases.
Below is a plot of the percentage of FOIA cases disposed of by trial
and the percentage of other civil cases disposed of by trial from 1979
to 2008.

This chart shows a difference in the trial rate between the two
groups that is statistically significant both over the thirty-year period
as a whole and for each individual year. Therefore, we can be
statistically confident that the difference between these trial rates is
224
meaningful and not the product of chance.
222. The data shows that from 1995 on, the number of trials hovers just above, or
at, zero. FJC Database 1979–2008, supra note 59. Using data from 1995 to 2008, a
regression of the percent of FOIA cases disposed of by trial over time reveals a line
that has a slope that is not statistically different from zero, meaning the trial rate is
not significantly increasing or decreasing over that time. Specifically, the coefficient
is .007 with a 95% confidence interval from -.028 to .042. That is, the confidence
interval includes the value zero, the coefficient (slope of the best-fit line) is not
statistically different from zero (a flat line).
223. See Burbank, supra note 215, at 578 (discussing the difficulty in assessing the
reasons for the so-called “vanishing” trial).
224. Statistical significance was measured using a proportions test. Although the
data on FOIA trials appears to represent a population (i.e., all data rather than a
sample of a larger set of data), which would eliminate the need for a significance test,

KWOKA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT TRIAL

3/26/2012 8:06 PM

259

The significant downward trend in both civil trials generally and
FOIA trials specifically deserves a short detour, if only because the
trend is so noticeable. The phenomenon of the “disappearing trial”
225
in civil litigation and its causes has been hotly debated.
For the
purposes of this Article, although the trend is noticeable, it is not
important. This Article is concerned with the difference between the
rate at which FOIA cases go to trial and the rate at which other civil
cases go to trial. A regression test reveals that for the first ten years of
data, FOIA trials fell at roughly the same rate as the overall trial rate
226
fell. The rate at which FOIA trials fell changed only when the FOIA
trial rate essentially bottomed out, hovering just over zero, with no
227
Given that trial rates in both groups have
further distance to fall.
fallen similarly, the trend indicates that the various factors that have
affected how many cases get to trial generally has affected both rates

it is not a true population because FOIA cases will continue to be adjudicated in
federal court in the future, and thus, the past FOIA adjudications remain a subset of
all FOIA adjudications. The category of other civil cases is a subset insofar as it does
not include future cases and also because it does not include cases prior to 1979.
Accordingly, a measure of statistical significance is still a meaningful test. For the
overall rates over thirty years, the statistical significance of the difference is probable
to a 1% confidence level, meaning there is a greater than 99% chance that the
difference between the trial rates in FOIA cases and other civil cases is not the
product of random chance. With regard to the proportions test for each year
individually, the difference between the rates of FOIA trials and of other civil trials is
statistically significant to at least a 5% confidence level (that is, there is a greater than
95% chance the difference is not the product of chance) and many to a 1%
confidence level (with the exception of 2003, which is significant only to a 15%
confidence level).
225. See, e.g., Cecil et al., supra note 203 (considering settlement as a reason for
vanishing trials); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate
and Why Should We Care?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2009) (same); Hadfield,
supra note 203 (considering data collection reasons for vanishing trials).
226. These rates were measured using a regression analysis. For the full thirty-year
data set, a regression of the other civil trial rate over time produces a line with the
coefficient (slope) of -.172, which indicates that the trial rate in non-FOIA civil cases
has fallen by an average of about 0.17% per year over the thirty years. As measured
by a t-statistic, this result is significant to a 95% confidence level with a confidence
interval ranging from -.208 to -.136, meaning that we can be 95% certain that the
true slope of the line falls between those coefficients. A regression of the FOIA trial
rate from 1979 to 1989 produces a line with the coefficient -.152 with a 95%
confidence interval ranging from -.274 to -.029. These rates are very similar and have
highly overlapping confidence intervals. Like the FOIA trial rates, however, if the
time period for the other civil trial rate is broken into two, it becomes clear that the
rate fell faster in the earlier, rather than the later, years. This trend is also the
natural result of the civil trial rate becoming so low that it had very little room left to
fall in the past decade or two. In any case, the trend is similar between the two
groups.
227. Data for the 1990 to 2008 period have a slightly downward sloping best-fit
regression line, as a regression of FOIA trials over this period of time produces a
coefficient (slope) of -.022. The 95% confidence interval ranges from -.046 to .002,
which includes zero (a flat line). The regression line is therefore not statistically
different from a flat line hovering above zero.
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in the same way, while the difference between them has remained
fairly constant throughout. These generally applicable trends do not
explain the difference in the rates of FOIA trials and other civil trials
at all points in time over the thirty-year period.
Knowing that FOIA cases are not being adjudicated by trial, we
must now look at how the cases are, in fact, adjudicated. In
comparison with the low trial rate among FOIA cases, the rate of
cases that reach judgment on motion before trial, which indicates
adjudication as a matter of law, is very high. The combined figures
from 1979 to 2008 reveal that out of 12,344 FOIA cases, 4702, or
228
38.09%, were disposed of by motion before trial. That percentage
may not sound significant until it is compared with other civil motion
dispositions during the same thirty-year period. For other types of
229
civil cases, only 12.08% were disposed of by motion.
Again, the
difference between these two rates overall and for each year
individually is statistically significant: there is a less than 0.1% chance
230
that the difference is due to chance.
This chart summarizes the
difference between FOIA cases’ dispositions and other civil cases’
dispositions over the thirty-year period:
1979–2008:

FOIA Cases
Other Civil Cases

Percent of Cases
Disposed of by Motion
38.09%
12.08%

Percent of Cases
Disposed of by Trial
0.71%
3.44%

As discussed above, FOIA cases involve a variety of commonly
231
occurring factual questions, just like any typical civil matter. Yet,
these cases are going to trial significantly less frequently than the
already low trial rate in other civil cases and are decided on motion
far more frequently than other civil cases. The numbers therefore
support the conclusion that judges rarely, if ever, conclude that
material factual disputes exist such that trials are necessary in FOIA
228. FJC Database 1979–2008, supra note 59.
229. Id. Out of 5,248,802 other civil cases, 634,148 were disposed of by motion.
Id.
230. The statistical significance of the difference between the trial rates among
FOIA cases and among other civil cases was also measured using a proportions test.
In that test, the rates of individual years were compared and the difference between
them was statistically significant to at least a 0.1% confidence level, meaning that
there is less than a 0.1% chance that the difference is not significant. The difference
between the overall rates was also significant to that level.
231. See supra Part II.B (describing the common factual questions under FOIA
exemptions 5, 6, and 7).
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cases, and judges very often find that all issues in the case can be
resolved as a matter of law.
One additional piece of empirical evidence underscores the
anomalous treatment of FOIA cases. The District Court for the
District of Columbia is the forum for a disproportionate share of
FOIA cases, disposing of 38% of all FOIA cases in the country, even
232
though it disposes of only 1.3% of all district court litigation.
Accordingly, judges in that court are more familiar with FOIA
litigation. FOIA litigators in the District of Columbia sense a
routinization of these cases and some unwillingness to look at a case’s
233
factual disputes.
The numbers support exactly that conclusion.
Although over the 1979 to 2008 period, 38% of all FOIA cases were
disposed of in D.C. District Court, only 13% of reported FOIA trials
234
occurred in that forum.
Put differently, 1% of FOIA cases were
decided on trial in other parts of the country, but in D.C., only 0.25%
235
were decided by trial.
The difference between those rates is
236
Judges outside of D.C., less familiar with
statistically significant.
FOIA and more used to traditional summary judgment application,
237
are more likely to find a factual dispute.
C. Standards of Appellate Review of Summary Judgment in FOIA Cases
Some circuits considering FOIA cases on appeal have departed
from traditional practice concerning the appropriate standard of
appellate review for cases decided on summary judgment. For the
reasons explained below, this departure constitutes another strong
indicator of courts’ conversion of questions of fact into questions of
238
law at the summary judgment stage in FOIA cases.
In the normal course of events, an appellate court reviews summary
232. FJC Database 1979–2008, supra note 59. The large proportion of cases filed
in the District Court for the District of Columbia is likely explained in part by FOIA’s
venue provision, which allows the plaintiff to sue in the district court where she
resides or has her principal place of business, in the district court where the agency
records are located (often the District of Columbia), or in the District Court for the
District of Columbia. 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B) (2006).
233. See Telephone Interview with Lucinda Sikes, Lecturer in Residence, Boalt
Hall, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley (Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Sikes Interview].
234. FJC Database, supra note 59.
235. Id.
236. Using a proportions test, the difference between the trial rates is statistically
significant to a 1% confidence level, meaning that we can be 99% certain that the
difference is meaningful.
237. FJC Database, supra note 59.
238. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 5–6, Berger v. IRS, 129 S. Ct. 2789
(2009) (mem.) (No. 08-884), 2009 WL 99141, at *i, *5–6 (petitioning the Court to
consider the question of what standard of review should be used to evaluate an
appeal from a grant of summary judgment in a FOIA case).
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judgment motion decisions de novo, deciding them in the first
239
instance without any deference to the lower court’s conclusions. By
definition, a grant of summary judgment can occur when judges are
240
presented only with questions of law.
However, only six circuits
apply a de novo standard of review to summary judgment decisions in
241
242
243
FOIA cases: the D.C. Circuit, First Circuit, Second Circuit, Sixth
244
245
246
Circuit, Eighth Circuit, and the Tenth Circuit.
The Third,
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all have a varying two247
248
249
tiered standard of review. Of these, the Third, Fourth, Ninth,
250
and Eleventh, review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings
251
The Seventh Circuit has developed a two-tiered
for clear error.
review in which it first determines if the district court had an
adequate factual basis for its decision and then reviews the entire

239. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 465 n.10
(1992); see also supra Part III.A (describing summary judgment as it is uniquely
applied to FOIA cases).
240. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see Silver, supra note 189, at 736–40 (presenting a
thorough analysis of the justifications for using de novo review specifically as to FOIA
summary judgment decisions).
241. Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 334 F.3d 55, 57 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
242. Church of Scientology Int’l v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 30 F.3d 224, 228 (1st Cir.
1994).
243. Wilner v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009).
244. Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075, 1078 (6th Cir.
1998).
245. Mo. Coal. for the Env’t Found. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 542 F.3d 1204,
1209 (8th Cir. 2008).
246. Forest Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 416 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir.
2005). But see Casad v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 301 F.3d 1247, 1251
(10th Cir. 2002) (“On appeal, the initial inquiry is whether the district court had an
adequate factual basis on which to base its decision. Assuming this prerequisite is
met, in a summary judgment case such as this one, we next ‘review de novo the
district court’s legal conclusions that the requested materials are covered by the
relevant FOIA exemptions.’” (citations omitted)). Even Casad’s articulation,
however, is actually a de novo standard; it just assures that, as a matter of law, there
has been adequate factual development prior to a ruling that there are no genuine
issues of fact.
247. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993).
248. Hunton & Williams v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 590 F.3d 272, 275–76 (4th Cir.
2010).
249. Lane v. Dep’t of the Interior, 523 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2008).
250. News-Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1189 (11th Cir.
2007).
251. The Third, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits also have a preliminary step of
reviewing the district court’s decision to make sure there was adequate factual
development of the record. Lane, 523 F.3d at 1135; News-Press, 489 F.3d at 1189;
McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1242. This standard of review is not often articulated in typical
summary judgment proceedings, but actually does not depart from the general rule
that summary judgment should not be granted if the nonmoving party has not had
adequate opportunity to discover relevant facts. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d), 28 U.S.C.
app. r. 56(d) (Supp. III 2010) (amended 2010).
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252

decision under the clear error standard.
The Fifth Circuit has
253
declined to weigh in on the debate.
That five circuits have mandated a two-tiered standard of review in
FOIA cases decided on summary judgment under which they review
district courts’ factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard
indicates that the district courts are routinely engaging in fact-finding
at the summary judgment stage in FOIA cases. The Ninth Circuit
explained:
At first glance this standard seems anomalous. It can best be
explained by reflecting upon the task confronting the district court
in a FOIA case. It must examine the requested document (usually
in camera, to avoid the risk of premature disclosure) to determine
whether it falls within any of FOIA’s statutory exemptions from
disclosure. Because there will rarely be any genuine issues of
material fact—the document says whatever it says—the case may
usually be decided on summary judgment. Even so, the proceeding
might better be described as a trial on a hidden record, where the
district court’s characterization of the requested document more
closely resembles a finding of fact than a conclusion of law. Of
course, we grant substantial deference to a district court’s fact
254
finding.

Other circuits employing the two-tiered standard likewise
acknowledge the factual nature of the district court’s task when
confronted with summary judgment motions in a FOIA case. The
Eleventh Circuit, for instance, has noted that the clearly erroneous
standard is applicable where “there was a factual dispute between the
parties as to the very nature of the withheld documents, and thus as
255
to whether they even fell within the applicable exemption.”
Even
the D.C. Circuit, which employs de novo review, has recognized that
“[w]hen the district court reviews an agency’s Vaughn index to verify
the validity of each claimed exemption, its determination resembles a
256
fact-finding process.”
Acknowledging this oddity, the court

252. See Enviro Tech Int’l, Inc. v. EPA, 371 F.3d 370, 373–74 (7th Cir. 2004) (“We
have acknowledged that use of the clearly erroneous standard is in tension with the
de novo standard that normally governs our review of summary judgment decisions.
We have also recognized that the courts of appeals are divided as to the appropriate
standard of review in FOIA cases decided by way of summary judgment. Indeed our
own case law is not entirely consistent on this point. Review for clear error remains
the norm for FOIA cases in this circuit.” (citations omitted)).
253. FlightSafety Servs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Labor, 326 F.3d 607, 610–11 & n.2 (5th
Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
254. Assembly of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 968 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.
1992).
255. News-Press, 489 F.3d at 1187–88 (emphases removed).
256. Summers v. Dep’t of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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explained that, “due to the peculiar nature of the FOIA, we have
created exceptions to the normal summary judgment review
257
processes.”
Thus, although district courts are almost universally deciding FOIA
cases on motions for summary judgment, the courts of appeals are
applying differing standards of review depending on the factual or
legal nature of the question on review. The only conclusion one can
draw from a standard of review that bifurcates review of factual
questions and review of legal questions is that district courts are
routinely using summary judgment to decide questions of fact in
FOIA cases.
IV. THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF FOIA TRIALS
As the previous Part demonstrated, summary judgment in FOIA
cases has become a vehicle for fact-finding rather than a means of
258
resolving only cases with no genuine factual disputes.
This
conversion of the summary judgment procedure in FOIA cases has
resulted in an almost complete disappearance of the FOIA trial from
259
the federal judicial docket. The remaining question is whether the
lack of FOIA trials matters. Is it even possible to have trials in these
types of cases? Even if FOIA cases went to trial, those trials would be
bench trials, not jury trials; a judge would therefore engage in factfinding either way. Moreover, by reviewing factual findings for clear
error, half of the courts of appeals are treating district court summary
judgment orders in the same manner they would treat review of a
bench trial order on appeal. How would a FOIA trial work, and
would plaintiffs benefit from having a trial in a FOIA case? If there
are benefits, do they outweigh the cost of having more trials? In
other words, is the absence of the FOIA trial meaningful? This Part
examines those questions.
A. Empirical Evidence
Data is a useful starting point in assessing whether FOIA litigants
might achieve greater success if the traditional summary judgment
standard were applied in FOIA cases, resulting in more of those cases
going to trial. The FJC Database records which party prevailed in a
given lawsuit.
That data, combined with the data on case
adjudication methods, sheds some light on how FOIA plaintiffs fare
257. Id.
258. See supra Part III.
259. See supra Part III.B.
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260

when a case is resolved by summary judgment versus a trial.
Normally, one would expect defendants to prevail far more
frequently than plaintiffs on summary judgment motions because
defendants do not bear the burden of proof at trial and therefore
261
have a lower standard at summary judgment. The FJC data reflect
this result. In non-FOIA civil cases, defendants prevail in cases
decided on motions before trial 63.5% of the time, and plaintiffs
262
prevail only 25.9% of the time. In FOIA cases, however, one would
expect the opposite—that plaintiffs should prevail far more
frequently than defendants on summary judgment motions because
263
the government bears the burden of proof on the merits. However,
the data represented in the following charts show that nothing could
be further from the truth. In FOIA cases decided on pretrial motion,
defendants prevail at even higher rates—a full 79.6% of the time in
264
comparison with plaintiffs’ 8.4% rate.
Prevailing Party in Motions Dispositions:
Other Civil Cases

FOIA Cases

260. FJC Database, supra note 59.
261. See Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Discouraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden
Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judgment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1023, 1043–44 (1989).
262. FJC Database, supra note 59. Prevailing, in this instance, is measured by the
“judgment for” field of the FJC Database, which has consistently been reported since
1979. See FJC Database Codebooks, supra note 202. The codes under this field
report judgment for plaintiff, for defendant, for both, unknown, and unreported. I
use only the judgment for plaintiff and for defendant codes to represent the parties’
relative likelihoods for success. Although, overall, there are vast numbers of cases
either unreported or unknown, there are only 10% to 12% of cases that are
unreported and unknown when examining only the judgment on motion and
judgment on trial categories. FJC Database, supra note 59.
263. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006) (“[T]he burden is on the agency to
sustain its action [to withhold agency records].”).
264. FJC Database, supra note 59. Even comparing plaintiffs’ prevailing rate, the
difference between this rate in motions dispositions in FOIA cases and in other civil
cases is significant to a 1% confidence level, indicating that we can be at least 99%
certain the difference is significant. Taking account of the burdens of proof, the
difference between the prevailing rate of plaintiffs in FOIA cases decided by motion
and defendants in other civil litigation is even greater and significant to an even
higher confidence level.
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Meanwhile, at trial, plaintiffs in non-FOIA civil cases prevail 42% of
265
In FOIA
the time, while defendants prevail 47.4% of the time.
cases, though an opposite trend should be expected, the trend is
similar to other civil cases: plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing at trial
increase to 26%, whereas defendants prevail 62% of the time at
266
trial.
Prevailing Party in Trial Dispositions:
Other Civil Cases

FOIA Cases

The data therefore indicate that FOIA plaintiffs are faring very
poorly when their cases are decided as a matter of law by motion and
are doing significantly better when their cases go to trial. The data
also indicate that although one would expect the government, by
bearing the burden of proof in FOIA cases, to fare worse on motion
and better at trial, it is actually doing better at the motion stage in
FOIA cases than defendants in other civil cases.
These numbers, however, should be viewed with some caution.
The small number of FOIA cases that have gone to trial itself cautions
267
against placing too much weight on these data.
In addition, this
265. Id.
266. Id. Again, even comparing plaintiffs’ prevailing rate, the difference between
this rate at trial in FOIA cases and in other civil cases is significant to a 1%
confidence level, indicating that we can be at least 99% certain the difference is
significant. Furthermore, accounting for the burdens of proof, the difference is even
greater between the prevailing rate of plaintiffs in FOIA cases that are tried and of
defendants in other civil litigation that are tried and is significant to an even higher
confidence level.
267. Despite the small numbers, the difference between plaintiff success rates in
FOIA cases decided by motion and FOIA cases decided by trial is statistically
significant to a 99% confidence level. Id. Likewise, the difference between plaintiff
success rates on summary judgment motion in FOIA cases and in other cases and the
difference between plaintiff success rates on trial in FOIA cases and other cases are
both statistically significant to a 99% confidence level. Id. Nonetheless, the oddities
of FOIA trials uncovered through research for this Article and the nonexistence of
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analysis shows a correlation between trials and better outcomes for
FOIA plaintiffs, but it in no way sheds light on actual causation. In
other words, particularly with this small set of data and the many
variables that can affect the outcome of a case, the FJC Database
cannot provide a basis for showing that the near exclusivity of
summary judgment is, by itself, causing plaintiffs to have a low
likelihood of prevailing in a FOIA case. Regardless of the limitations,
however, the correlation between higher success and trial
adjudication—particularly in light of the failure of that success to
align with our expectations based on the success of the party who
does not bear the burden of proof in other civil litigation—provides
some reason to believe that summary judgment fails to afford FOIA
plaintiffs a full opportunity to litigate their cases.
B. Past FOIA Trials: Learning from Records and Attorney Interviews
The hypothesis that summary judgment may disadvantage FOIA
plaintiffs is supported by a comparison between the procedures
available to FOIA litigants at the summary judgment stage and at
trial. The unique nature of summary judgment processes in FOIA
268
cases, discussed in detail in Part III, has often been attributed to the
269
information imbalance between the government and the requester.
Special summary judgment procedures in FOIA cases have attempted
to correct for the information imbalance between the parties,
including the use of the Vaughn index and in camera review of the
270
271
records themselves. Discovery in FOIA cases is disfavored, and as
a result, the requester typically can only challenge the adequacy of
the government’s Vaughn index, not the veracity of the statements it
272
contains. The resolution of factual questions in a forum where the
plaintiff cannot effectively challenge the assertions in the

those trials recently cautions against placing too much weight on these statistical
results.
268. See supra Part III.A.
269. See Silver, supra note 189, at 743. Interestingly, while the D.C. Circuit has
asserted (with little support) that the “vast majority of FOIA cases can be resolved on
summary judgment,” it recently held out the ephemeral possibility of a FOIA trial as
a basis for concluding that a requester was not entitled to an attorneys’ fees award in
cases where the government produced the records before adjudication of the claim
on the merits but in which the government would have won at summary judgment.
Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 522, 527–28 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
270. See supra Part III.A.
271. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 65 (D.D.C.
2002).
272. See, e.g., Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 30–31 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(challenging the adequacy of agency affidavits).
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government’s affidavits and other evidence is made even less
favorable to the plaintiff because of many courts’ acknowledged
deference to the government’s position. As one court said in
analyzing a claim under exemption 5, “[t]here should be
considerable deference to the Commission’s judgment as to what
constitutes, as our Court of Appeals has put it, ‘part of the agency
give-and-take—of the deliberative process—by which the decision
273
itself is made.’”
Even where unacknowledged, there is an
unquestionable tendency to accept the government’s view of the facts
274
when there is a dispute. Yet, de novo review of agency withholdings
is mandated by the statute and deference to the government’s
275
position is nowhere to be found.
Summary judgment, therefore,
276
has severe limitations from the perspective of a FOIA plaintiff.
Perhaps no procedure can completely overcome the disadvantage a
plaintiff faces as a result of the information imbalance in FOIA
277
cases.
Nonetheless, comparing summary judgment to what we
know about how FOIA cases are tried can shed light on what seems to
be a missed opportunity to even the playing field in FOIA litigation.
A look at the records in those rare FOIA trials demonstrates both that
FOIA trials are possible and that they are useful. In addition to
looking at the dockets and records in FOIA cases that went to trial, I
also interviewed some FOIA plaintiffs’ attorneys who litigated a few of
those rare FOIA trials, focusing on what they saw as the costs and
benefits of trial adjudications.
1.

Trial records
Although the vast majority of the eighty-eight FOIA trials identified
in the FJC Database date back two decades or more, I was able to
obtain court documents for a sufficient number to understand how
273. Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 600 F. Supp. 114, 118
(D.D.C. 1984) (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
274. See, e.g., Access Reports v. Dep’t of Justice, 926 F.2d 1192, 1197 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
275. The only statutory deference granted to the government in FOIA itself is
deference to government affidavits concerning the government’s technical capacity
to reproduce certain records. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006). Claims of
withholding, reviewed de novo, do not get any official deference from the courts
under FOIA. See id. ( “In [a case to enjoin the agency from withholding agency
records] the court shall determine the matter de novo . . . .”).
276. See Burbank, supra note 216, at 592, 622 (commenting generally on the
disappearing civil trial and maintaining that “even the most hard-hearted empiricist”
should be persuaded that “some litigants in some types of cases in some courts are
not receiving reasonable opportunities to present their cases”). Compared with
other types of cases, the special procedures used in summary judgment in FOIA cases
only decrease the ability of plaintiffs to present their cases.
277. See Silver, supra note 189, at 751.
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these trials arose and how they were conducted. Examining the
records showed that a significant number of those trials were not
evidentiary trials on the merits of a FOIA claim. Some, but not all, of
278
that discrepancy was due to reporting error.
Other trials were
correctly reported, but the trials actually concerned a non-FOIA issue
279
in each case, and the FOIA issue was resolved in another manner.
Additionally, some trials were actually brought under the Privacy
280
Act. Although many of the issues in Privacy Act cases are similar to
those in FOIA cases, Privacy Act trials often have different and special
281
considerations that make them less useful to analyze.
Although I
was able to verify the nature of the proceedings for a significant
portion of the eighty-eight reported trials, for many I was not able to
locate a written decision of any sort that would identify the issues that
were tried or other characteristics of the proceedings. Finally, I
located the records in several trials that were not included in the FJC
Database because they were outside the date range for which data is
available. Despite limitations, the actual FOIA trials with sufficiently
detailed written decisions and other records allow us to learn a great
deal about how courts have treated these rare FOIA trials.
The issues most commonly tried in FOIA cases arose under
282
exemption 4, which permits withholding of “trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
283
privileged or confidential.” To properly invoke this exemption, the
government is required to show that records contain either “trade
secrets” or confidential commercial or financial information that

278. E.g., Barnes v. Dep’t of Army, No. 90-00390 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 1990) (order
granting summary judgment to defendant, although this case was coded as a trial).
279. E.g., McAdams v. United States, No. 05-06331 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2006) (order
referring matter to magistrate judge for bench trial on claim under Federal Tort
Claims Act after FOIA claim had already been dismissed).
280. See cases cited infra note 281.
281. In each of the cases, the plaintiff was claiming damages, not simply injunctive
relief as is available in a FOIA case. A damages determination is more likely to seem
factual to a judge and therefore go to trial. See Dong v. Smithsonian Inst., 943 F.
Supp. 69, 70 (D.D.C. 1996) (employee sued employer for damages resulting from
failure to properly collect information under the Privacy Act); Thompson v. Dep’t of
Transp. U.S. Coast Guard, 547 F. Supp. 274, 276 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (employee sued
employer for damages resulting from improper collection and maintenance of
employee records); Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 526 F. Supp. 679, 680
(W.D. Okla. 1980) (damages action against employer), aff’d sub. nom. Smith v. U.S.
Dep’t of Air Force, 703 F.2d 583 (1982); Calhoun v. Wells, No. 79-2337-2, 1980 WL
1637, at *1 (D.S.C. July 30, 1980) (taxpayer sued IRS for damages resulting from
circulation of information about taxpayer to taxpayer’s clients).
282. See HAMMITT ET AL., supra note 152, at 403 (“When a FOIA trial has occurred
it was often in Exemption 4 cases where the issue is whether a document qualifies as
a ‘trade secret’ or confidential commercial information.”).
283. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006).
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Most
came from a non-governmental person or business.
exemption 4 claims involve confidential commercial or financial
285
information rather than trade secrets.
Although judicial
interpretation has created a confusing, bifurcated standard for
286
reviewing these claims, for the purposes of this Article, it is most
important that the exemption’s applicability often turns on whether
release of the records would cause substantial competitive injury to
the person who submitted the information to the government (often
287
a private business).
Competitive injury, in turn, requires the
government or the submitter to establish that the submitter faces
actual competition and demonstrate the likely consequences of
288
disclosure.
FOIA trials concerning exemption 4 focus on precisely these
289
Findings of fact made in these trials include the
factual disputes.
284. Id.
285. To conclude that a record contains a trade secret, the decision-maker must
find that the information is actually kept secret, that it is commercially valuable, and
that it is a “plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing,
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the
end product of either innovation or substantial effort.” Pub. Citizen Health
Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983). In Public Citizen, the
D.C. Circuit rejected the much broader definition of trade secrets found in the
Restatement of Torts. See id. Even though only the Tenth Circuit has expressly adopted
the Public Citizen test, it is nonetheless the prevailing view, as no other circuit has
adopted any other test. See Anderson v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d
936, 943–44 (10th Cir. 1990) (adopting the Public Citizen test). In practice, because it
is easier to show that records contain confidential commercial information than to
show they contain trade secrets, the former is more often urged by the government
or intervening business.
286. In Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the D.C. Circuit
differentiated between information voluntarily provided to the government and
submissions that were compulsory. 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc). In
essence, if submissions are voluntary, the potential impairment of the government’s
ability to obtain records voluntarily in the future can be considered, whereas if a
submission was compulsory, that factor does not come into play. See id. Regardless
of the category, a record can be exempt from disclosure if its release would cause the
submitter substantial competitive harm. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
287. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 498 F.2d at 770–71.
288. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 169 F.3d 16, 18 (D.C.
Cir. 1999).
289. I placed seven trials in this category. In Def. of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of
Agric., 656 F. Supp. 2d 68, 70 (D.D.C. 2009); Cohen, Dunn & Sinclair, P.C. v. Gen.
Servs. Admin., No. 92-57-A, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21730, at *18–20 (E.D. Va. Sept.
10, 1992); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Dep’t of the Army, 595 F. Supp. 352, 353, 356
(D.D.C. 1984); J.H. Lawrence Co. v. Smith, 545 F. Supp. 421, 423–24 (D. Md. 1982);
Doherty v. FTC, No. 80-0513, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262, at *2 (D.D.C. June 24,
1981); Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t v. Dep’t of Energy, 494 F. Supp. 287, 290 (D.D.C.
1980); Green v. Dep’t of Commerce, 468 F. Supp. 691, 693–94 (D.D.C. 1979). One
additional case may qualify. See Glacier Park Found. v. Andrus, 506 F. Supp. 637, 641
(D. Mont. 1981) (cursorily denying motions for summary judgment on a FOIA issue
that was distinct from the main disputes in the case), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Glacier Park Found. v. Watt, 663 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1982).
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following statements:
The defendant has failed to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that disclosure of each piece of information will cause
substantial harm to the competitive position of the person
submitting the report. All of the witnesses conceded that some of
the information was not genuinely confidential; it might be either
out of date, or already known to competitors, or concern a
proposed transaction which was never consummated. Publication
of such information could not conceivably harm the competitive
290
position of the submitter.
The distributors and dealers who contributed information to the
List are free to disseminate the information to competitors of [the
business submitter], however it is industry practice to keep this
information confidential. . . . The present heat pump market is
found to be highly competitive. . . . The list is maintained
291
confidentially in a locked cabinet with limited access.
Disclosure of the information at issue would allow a sophisticated
competitor to deduce technical information concerning
anticipated (but unannounced) network configuration, capabilities
and performance of [the business submitter]. . . . From the
detailed prices for access, a competitor could tell [the business
submitter’s] current method of providing access and future plans
to change this method, as well as its plans of increasing its “points
292
and presence” (the closet point of entry onto the network).

These examples demonstrate the most typical kinds of factual
findings in those rare FOIA cases that make it to trial. In effect, these
findings concern the classic factual determinations involved in an
exemption 4 case concerning the historical fact inquiry into whether
the record is actually kept confidential and the predictive fact inquiry
into whether the release of the record will cause injury in the
competitive marketplace.
Another notable feature of exemption 4 cases is that the business
submitter is often a party to the litigation—either as an intervenordefendant in a FOIA case brought by a requester, or as a plaintiff in a
reverse-FOIA case, where the submitter seeks to prevent disclosure by
293
the government under FOIA. Even when the business submitter is

290. Green, 468 F. Supp. at 694.
291. Doherty, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262 at *6.
292. Cohen, Dunn & Sinclair, P.C., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21730 at *19–20.
293. See, e.g., In Def. of Animals, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (business submitter
intervened as defendant); Cohen, Dunn & Sinclair, P.C., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21730
at *2 (same); J.H. Lawrence Co., 545 F. Supp. at 423 (same).
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not a party, the submitter may provide expert testimony at trial.
Interestingly, in at least three of the exemption 4 trials, the
295
plaintiffs did not put on any witnesses of their own.
Rather than
making an affirmative case, the plaintiffs in these cases chose to
attack the sufficiency of the evidence put on by the defense and the
296
credibility of the defense witnesses.
However, not all of the FOIA trials for which records were available
were exemption 4 cases. In one trial, the issue tried was “whether the
court should issue a permanent mandatory injunction to compel the
INS to process [the] FOIA requests [at issue] within the time allotted
297
by statute.”
The court took testimony and other evidence on the
plaintiff’s claim “that the Miami INS office has a pattern and practice
of not responding to FOIA requests in the time period designated by
298
[the statute].”
The court also admitted evidence regarding the
government’s claim that its large backlog of FOIA requests
constituted “exceptional circumstances” under the statute, thereby
relieving the agency from its duty to respond within the time
299
period.
In another tried case, the issues included whether the FOIA
requests were processed in accordance with the law and whether the
records fell under various FOIA exemptions, including exemption 7
covering some law enforcement records, exemption 5 covering the
300
agency’s deliberative process, and others.
The findings of fact
included:
“[s]ome of the documents sought . . . contain the
294. See Doherty, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262 at *2–3 (“At trial, defendant
presented one witness, Mr. Peter Alexander, who is the General Manager of
Marketing of [the business submitter]. He was accepted as an expert witness by the
Court in the area of heat pump marketing . . . .”); Braintree Elec. Light Dep’t, 494 F.
Supp. at 289 (“Mr. Frank W. Mills, sales manager for [the business submitter],
testified persuasively about the company’s business practices and the practices of its
competitors.”).
295. See In Def. of Animals, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 74; Doherty, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13262 at *3; Green, 468 F. Supp. at 693.
296. See infra note 313 and accompanying text (revealing one cost-saving strategy
of plaintiffs is to rely on the ability to cross-examine the defendant’s expert witness
rather than use one’s own expert witness).
297. Ray v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 770 F. Supp. 1544, 1546 (S.D. Fla. 1990), vacated
on other grounds, 908 F.2d 1549 (11th Cir. 1990), rev’d, 502 U.S. 164 (1991).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1547 (internal quotation marks omitted).
300. Yon v. IRS, 671 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1987). In addition to this case,
the FJC Database contains another case recorded as a trial in which it is unclear
whether actual evidentiary proceedings took place, although the judge issued
findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Bernal v. IRS, No. C 79-1117, 1980 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12134, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1980) (describing court findings “[a]fter
an in camera review of the documents withheld by the Internal Revenue Service and
at issue in this case”); see also supra Parts II.B.1, B.3 (discussing factual issues that arise
under exemptions 5 and 7).
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defendant’s internal agency deliberations” and “[r]elease of any of
the defendant’s criminal investigation files at this time could
reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement
301
proceedings.”
Although rare, the examples of FOIA cases that have gone to trial
demonstrate an important point: it is possible to try a FOIA case.
There is nothing about FOIA that makes it inherently unsusceptible
to evidentiary proceedings, witness testimony, cross-examination, or
credibility determinations. Courts have managed to conduct these
proceedings to trial verdicts, issuing findings of fact and conclusions
of law, just like bench trials in other civil cases.
2.

Attorney interviews
Interviews with attorneys who conducted some of the rare FOIA
trials provide insight as to the benefits that trials may confer on FOIA
302
Overall, interviewees indicated that those benefits
plaintiffs.
include the pre-trial right to discovery, the ability to cross-examine
witnesses at the trial itself, and the ability to focus the judge’s
attention on the deficiencies of the government’s case in a way not
possible on written submissions. They also mention the opportunity
to obtain more favorable settlements between the parties.
Eric Glitzenstein is the attorney who litigated In Defense of Animals v.
303
United States Department of Agriculture, an exemption 4 case in which
304
He explained that pre-trial
the business submitter intervened.
depositions of the defendants’ experts convinced him that the
305
defendants would be unable to meet their burden of proof.
As a
result, he decided not to put on any experts of his own, but rather to
rely at trial on cross-examination to demonstrate why the defendants
could not meet the standard for confidential commercial
306
information.
Glitzenstein also believed that his ability to cross301. Yon, 671 F. Supp. at 1346.
302. The set of attorneys interviewed is not randomized, nor was it designed to be
so. Rather, I chose only to interview attorneys for requesters, as the costs and
benefits of trial from the perspective of the requester was my focus of inquiry.
Moreover, government attorneys are often severely constrained in discussing the
cases they litigate. In addition, I contacted attorneys who represented plaintiffs
whom I could identify as repeat FOIA litigators, such that they would have sufficient
FOIA litigation experience to compare their trial experience with the more typical
manner of resolving FOIA cases. The set of attorneys I contacted was also limited by
my ability to locate, at a minimum, a docket sheet so as to identify counsel of record
in a given case.
303. 656 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2009).
304. Id. at 70.
305. Telephone Interview with Eric Glitzenstein, Partner, Meyer Glitzenstein &
Crystal (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter Glitzenstein Interview].
306. Id.
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examine the experts, to get the court’s undivided attention, and to
expose the weakness of the other party’s expert testimony were the
307
main factors in winning the case.
308
Lucinda Sikes litigated Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA,
another exemption 4 case. She described the effect of the court’s
denial of cross-motions for summary judgment and order to proceed
to trial: the government produced most or all of the requested
309
records. She believed that the government realized its own inability
to meet its burden of proof at trial and did not want to invest the
310
resources as a result.
Alan Morrison, a long-time FOIA litigator,
echoed Sikes’s observation; he noted that in early FOIA cases, denials
of summary judgment and the corresponding impending trials could
311
prompt the parties to settle favorably to plaintiffs. As such, it is not
only the plaintiffs who feel the potential burden of conducting a trial;
the government also feels that burden, producing an incentive to
compromise. Compromise, in a FOIA case, necessarily involves the
release of at least some of the requested records.
Interviewees, nonetheless, unanimously expressed concern over
the cost of trying a FOIA case. Glitzenstein estimated that it took his
firm hundreds of hours to prepare for trial, in comparison to the 50
or 100 hours it might take a seasoned litigator to write a summary
312
judgment brief in a FOIA case.
He noted that the costs would
escalate greatly if the plaintiff decided to use his own expert, rather
than rely on cross-examination to point out the deficiencies in the
313
defendants’ witness testimony.
Sikes expressed the same initial
314
reaction: going to trial is very burdensome for FOIA requesters.
315
Girardeau Spann, who litigated Green v. Department of Commerce, said
316
that he tried to avoid trial because of the cost in time and money.
Even aside from monetary costs, locating experts might be difficult
317
for plaintiffs. Katherine Meyer, who litigated Doherty v. FTC,
307. Id.
308. 953 F. Supp. 400 (D.D.C. 1996).
309. Sikes Interview, supra note 233.
310. Id.
311. Telephone Interview with Alan Morrison, Lerner Family Assoc. Dean for Pub.
Interest & Pub. Serv. Law, George Washington Univ. Law Sch. (Sept. 3, 2010)
[hereinafter Morrison Interview].
312. Glitzenstein Interview, supra note 305.
313. Id. Of course, if a case is tried, it is almost certain there will be summary
judgment motions first. Accordingly, the costs of trial are cumulative to the costs of
disposing of the case on motion.
314. Sikes Interview, supra note 233.
315. 468 F. Supp. 691 (D.D.C. 1979).
316. Telephone Interview with Girardeau Spann, Professor of Law, Georgetown
Univ. Law Ctr. (Sept. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Spann Interview].
317. No. 80-0513, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13262 (D.D.C. June 24, 1981).
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recalled trying to find an expert for the trial in that case but said she
318
Glitzenstein noted that in cases involving
was unable to do so.
business interests, the business’s resources are likely to exceed
319
plaintiffs’ resources at trial.
Nonetheless, several interviewees felt that the costs of trial could be
justified. Morrison opined that having a half-day trial with two or
three witnesses is not a significant ordeal and can be faster for the
320
parties and the court if the judge simply decides all of the issues.
He noted that a trial judgment also provides some immunization
against reversal on appeal and thus lets the parties resolve the matter
321
with more finality.
In three examined cases, the plaintiffs put no
expert witness on at all, but relied on poking holes in the
government’s case through cross-examination; two of those plaintiffs
322
prevailed. In the third case, Meyer indicated that the law was very
323
unfavorable to the plaintiffs.
As such, the burden on plaintiffs in
trying FOIA cases with genuine factual disputes may not always be
terribly high.
Some of that burden might also be lessened through the district
court’s discretionary power to fashion appropriate proceedings. In
Public Citizen Health Research Group, the district court ordered limited
proceedings, admitting the expert affidavits as direct examination
324
and then allowing only cross examination at trial.
Although the
case was resolved before trial, Sikes said she believed that preparing
for trial would not have been as burdensome as it otherwise might
have been because of the court’s trial order fashioning limited
325
proceedings.
On balance, the failure of summary judgment to honestly resolve
factual disputes and adequately allow a plaintiff to test the
government’s assertions weigh in favor of a more traditional
application of summary judgment standards that, in turn, would
result in more FOIA trials in appropriate cases. The ability to
conduct discovery and cross-examine the government’s witnesses
cannot be replicated through the Vaughn index procedure or in
318. Telephone Interview with Katherine Meyer, Partner, Meyer Glitzenstein &
Crystal (Sept. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Meyer Interview].
319. Glitzenstein Interview, supra note 305.
320. Morrison Interview, supra note 311.
321. Id.
322. Glitzenstein Interview, supra note 305; Meyer Interview, supra note 318;
Spann Interview, supra note 316.
323. Meyer Interview, supra note 318.
324. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 953 F. Supp. 400, 406 (D.D.C.
1996).
325. Sikes Interview, supra note 233.
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camera review. Litigators who have had the rare opportunity to use
trial proceedings in a FOIA case confirm that cross-examination and
discovery, combined with the ability to focus the court’s undivided
326
The
attention on key issues, can be powerful tools for plaintiffs.
failure to recognize factual disputes in FOIA cases or simply to resolve
them as a matter of law on summary judgment motions disserves
FOIA litigants and hinders the public’s access to government records.
CONCLUSION: LITIGATION STRATEGIES
Summary judgment can only be granted when there are no
327
Yet, although the most common
genuine issues of material fact.
FOIA disputes require the decision-maker to make factual findings of
328
a historical or predictive nature, FOIA cases are resolved almost
invariably by motion, and FOIA trials are exceedingly rare in
329
comparison with trials in other civil cases.
Moreover, the courts
themselves acknowledge the routine resolution of factual disputes in
FOIA cases at the summary judgment stage, both in their summary
judgment decisions and in the appellate courts’ anomalous review of
so-called factual findings in FOIA cases decided by summary
330
judgment. Analyses of case outcomes and the costs and benefits of
judicial procedures in summary judgment versus trial adjudication in
FOIA cases indicate that in eliminating FOIA trials from the federal
judicial docket, courts have undermined plaintiffs’ ability to fully
331
litigate their cases and thereby diminished access to public records.
What, then, should be done? A natural inclination would be to
conclude that courts should simply apply the summary judgment
332
standard in a more honest and consistent way in FOIA cases.
Although a laudable goal, it will not happen unprompted. To work
toward that goal, litigators should adopt tactics that encourage courts
to think more critically about when summary judgment is the
326. Cf. Robert P. Burns, What Will We Lose If the Trial Vanishes? 10 (Nw. Univ. Sch.
of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 11-48, 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1851776 (“[C]ross-examination can serve to
demonstrate that even the apparently chaste and ‘factual’ narratives of direct
examination themselves have an element of willfulness about them, apparent in both
the remaining characterizations that the witness chooses and the inevitable selectivity
and ordering of the facts recounted.”).
327. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
328. Supra Part II.
329. Supra Part III.B.
330. Supra Parts III.A, C.
331. Supra Part IV.
332. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 189, at 757 (“When there are genuine issues of
material fact, the district court should make factual findings and determine the case
after a trial—not on summary judgment.”).
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appropriate vehicle for resolving FOIA cases and when it is not.
First, FOIA plaintiffs should serve discovery requests on the agency
333
defendant concerning every relevant fact issue in the case.
Although courts may believe discovery in FOIA cases is disfavored,
not allowed, or limited to the Vaughn index, courts might be more
willing to consider the possibility that discovery is appropriate in
FOIA cases if more litigants request discovery. After all, no rule or
statute prohibits discovery in a FOIA case or exempts FOIA cases
334
from the normal discovery rules.
Thus, when discovery is denied,
FOIA attorneys should litigate the denial of discovery and bring
factual disputes to the court’s attention.
Second, at the summary judgment stage, litigators should adopt a
two-pronged strategy. Many FOIA cases are resolved on crossmotions for summary judgment, in which each party is arguing it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Frequently, plaintiffs do not
argue in the alternative that even if they are not entitled to judgment
as a matter of law, judgment for the government is precluded by a
335
Plaintiffs should make this
genuine issue of material fact.
alternative argument so that summary judgment is not presumed to
be the appropriate vehicle for resolution by the parties as well as the
courts. If a plaintiff obtains discovery, the facts in that discovery will
provide a useful method for demonstrating a genuine issue for the
alternative argument. If a plaintiff is denied discovery, the plaintiff
should oppose the grant of summary judgment to the government
336
and seek an opportunity to develop the record under Rule 56(d).
This strategy may highlight for the court why discovery was needed in
the first place and cause the court to reconsider its position.
Finally, if a district court grants summary judgment to the
333. See supra Part II.B (providing examples of such factual issues).
334. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006) (failing to address discovery); FED. R. CIV. P. 26
(failing to address FOIA).
335. E.g., Brief in Opposition to Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and in support of ACLU’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ACLU v. Dep’t of
Defense, 406 F. Supp. 2d 330 (No. 04-4151) (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-v-department-defense (arguing against
the government’s motion for summary judgment only by claiming ACLU’s
entitlement to summary judgment, and not, in the alternative, the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact for trial); Brief in Support of Public Citizen’s CrossMotion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to USTR’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, Public Citizen Global Trade Watch v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, No. 01-00096 (D.D.C. Sept. 13, 2001) (same), available at
http://www.citizen.org/litigation/forms/cases/getlinkforcase.cfm?cID=73.
336. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d) (“If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration
that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition,
the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain
affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate
order.”).
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government in a case where the plaintiff believes there is a genuine
issue of material fact, the plaintiff should argue on appeal not only
that he or she—rather than the government—was entitled to
summary judgment, but that judgment as a matter of law for the
government was, in the alternative, precluded by factual disputes.
Again, if discovery and an opportunity for evidentiary development
under Rule 56(d) were denied, those issues should also be appealed.
As with other civil litigation, not every FOIA case involves a
genuine dispute of material fact. When those factual disputes arise,
however, plaintiffs’ lawyers should not shy away from them, but
337
should call those disputes to the courts’ attention.
By reminding
courts that FOIA cases can—and sometimes should—be tried, and by
pressing courts to try appropriate FOIA cases, the goal of government
transparency will be more fully realized.

337. That many, if not most, FOIA litigators do not have experience trying FOIA
cases (or perhaps trying cases at all), is another obstacle. As Robert Burns has said of
falling trial rates generally, the lack of trials means “[f]ewer ‘litigators’ are
comfortable trying cases. This is, of course, a self-sustaining development.” Burns,
supra note 326, at 14. FOIA plaintiffs’ attorneys should be aware of any personal
aversion to trials they may have and lean against their inclination to avoid trying
appropriate FOIA cases.

